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I. LENDING
A. MORTGAGES
HE Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Travelers Insurance Co. v.
Bosler1 ruled for a lender in a case involving a nonrecourse provi-
sion and its effect on a guaranty agreement. Travelers became the
owner and holder of a promissory note in the original principal amount of
$11,600,000.00 by way of (1) an assignment of a 90% participation inter-
est from the prior owner and holder and (2) an assignment of the remain-
ing 10% interest by the Resolution Trust Corporation as the receiver of
the prior owner and holder. The note was secured by a deed of trust on
an apartment complex and by a continuing guaranty agreement dated as
of the date of the note executed by seven guarantors. The prior owner
and holder of the note subsequently entered into a modification agree-
ment with the borrower, which contained a nonrecourse provision. The
guarantors also executed a second guaranty agreement at the time the
modification agreement was signed. The borrower defaulted under the
note and Travelers foreclosed on the apartment complex. In the
meantime, the guarantors filed a petition seeking a declaratory judgment
that they were not personally liable under the note or the guaranty agree-
ments because of the nonrecourse provisions of the modification agree-
ment. Travelers counterclaimed for its deficiency, the amount of which
had been stipulated to by the parties. The parties filed competing mo-
tions for summary judgment and the guarantors won the first round when
the trial court granted their motion and denied Travelers'. Travelers ap-
pealed and the court of appeals had little trouble in holding that while the
nonrecourse provision absolved the borrower and the borrower's general
partners from personal liability in their maker and partner capacities, the
guarantors remained fully liable for the deficiency in their capacities as
guarantors under both the first and second guaranty. 2 The court raced
through the plaintiff's other points, denying them all, and then reversed
the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The court
1. 906 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
2. Id. at 643.
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was able to render judgment in favor of Travelers since the lender wisely
obtained a stipulation from the other side as to the amount of the
deficiency.
The next case started its way through the appellate process in 1992 and
was finally decided in 1995. It provides another reason for lenders to
read their loan documents and to abide by their terms. In Edwards v.
Holleman3 the borrower defaulted on two promissory notes to Galveston
Savings and Loan which were secured by first and second lien deeds of
trust on the borrower's home. The lender instituted foreclosure proceed-
ings, but before the foreclosure occurred, the borrower found a buyer for
the property and requested a payoff from the lender. The amount which
the lender provided not only included the unpaid principal and interest,
but also over $18,000.00 in attorney's fees, trustee's fees, and trustee's
expenses. The borrower paid under protest and then sued the lender and
the president of the savings and loan, as well as the trustee under the
deeds of trust. The jury found that reasonable trustee's fees and expenses
were less than what was charged and as a result awarded the borrower
$10,000.00 in punitive damages against the defendants for breaching their
fiduciary duty to the borrower. The lender was declared insolvent after
the judgment and only the president appealed. The court of appeals held
that the borrower was liable only for the lender's attorney's fees, but not
the trustee's fees and expenses since the foreclosure had not taken place. 4
On further appeal, the Texas Supreme Court held that the provisions of
the notes and deeds of trust required the borrower to pay reasonable fees
and expenses of the trustee, even though the deed of trust lien was not
foreclosed.5 The supreme court remanded the case to the court of ap-
peals to consider other points of error raised by the president. On re-
mand, the court of appeals discussed the trustee's fees and the trustee's
expenses. The president testified that he calculated his trustee's fees by
charging 10% of the unpaid balance of the delinquent debt. The first lien
deed of trust, however, provided only for a reasonable trustee's fee. The
second lien deed of trust provided for a 5% commission if the property
was sold at foreclosure. The court also considered the fact that the presi-
dent was an employee of the savings and loan and not a third-party
trustee. He did not receive a separate trustee's fee from the savings and
loan. The court affirmed the jury's findings that the trustee's fee and ex-
penses were unreasonable and breached the president's fiduciary duty to
the borrower.6
Howell v. Murray Mortgage Co.7 presents the interesting question of
whether an administrator of a dependent administration is subject to a
due-on-sale clause contained in a deed of trust of the dependent estate.
3. 893 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
4. Edwards v. Holleman, 842 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992),
rev'd per curiam, 862 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1993).
5. Edwards, 862 S.W.2d at 581.
6. Edwards, 893 S.W.2d at 119.
7. 890 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied).
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During the administration of his brother's estate, the administrator ob-
tained an order from the probate court authorizing the sale of his
brother's home. The administrator accepted an offer from a purchaser
calling for an assumption of the existing note and the execution of a sec-
ond lien note in favor of the estate. The sales contract was conditioned
on the approval by the lender of the sale and the assumption because the
deed of trust contained a due-on-sale clause. The lender refused to grant
its approval and the sale did not take place. The administrator sued the
lender seeking a declaratory judgment canceling the restriction on the
transfer of the property and an injunction requiring the lender to record a
release of the transfer restriction. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the lender and the administrator appealed. The appel-
lant argued the property was under the control of the probate court in
custodia legis (custody of the law) and therefore the property was re-
leased from the constraints of the due-on-sale clause. 8 Appellant based
this theory on the line of cases holding that a dependent administration
suspends certain contractual provisions.9 The court agreed that
[c]learly, the "opening of administration" suspends a creditor's right
to contractually repossess or sell property subject to the administra-
tion. The administrator has the absolute right to administer the es-
tate and dispose of the property, but this right does not extend to
extinguishing a creditor's right to be paid upon the sale of estate
property.10
Appellant also relied on a section from the probate code which states that
upon order of the probate court "equity in land securing an indebtedness
may be sold subject to such indebtedness, or with an assumption of such
indebtedness, at public or private sale, as appears to the court to be for
the best interest for the estate."" The court held that this section only
"speaks to the right of the court to approve a credit sale. It does not
empower the court to require a creditor to make a loan, extend a loan or
make a loan assumable."'1 2 The court also ruled against appellant's public
policy argument. Because of the absence of any statutory or case law
precedent, the court upheld the summary judgment in favor of the
lender.13
Oryx Energy Co. v. Union National Bank'4 presents another look at
the Texas courts' struggle with the concept of an absolute assignment of
rents. In this case, the bank made a purchase money loan to Santa Fe for
the acquisition of a building which was already leased to Oryx. Oryx was
8. Id at 81.
9. See Pearce v. Stokes, 155 Tex. 364, 291 S.W.2d 309, 310 (1956); Rivera v. Morales,
733 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bozeman v. Folliott,
556 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e); Universal
Credit Co. v. Ratliff, 57 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1933, no writ).
10. Howell, 890 S.W.2d at 83.
11. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 348 (Vernon 1985).
12. Howell, 890 S.W.2d at 81.
13. Id at 87.
14. 895 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).
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required to execute a subordination and non-disturbance agreement at
closing. The deed of trust executed by Santa Fe contained an "absolute"
assignment of rents. In 1988, Oryx decided to close its office and ap-
proached the bank about buying out the lease. Oryx was told by the bank
to negotiate directly with Santa Fe instead of the lender. Oryx negotiated
a buy-out with Santa Fe that included the payment of $750,000.00 to
Santa Fe and $300,000.00 to Santa Fe's president. Santa Fe missed two of
its note payments to the bank in 1989. The bank sued Oryx, Santa Fe,
and Santa Fe's president for breach of contract and under various tort
theories. The court granted the bank's motion for partial summary judg-
ment on the contract claim against Oryx to the tune of $1,050,000.15 Oryx
appealed after the court severed the remaining claims. The main issue
before the San Antonio Court of Appeals was whether Oryx breached
any contractual obligations with the lender by paying the buy-out pro-
ceeds directly to Santa Fe and its president.16 The only agreement exe-
cuted by Oryx was the Subordination and Non-disturbance Agreement.
The court found the document did not contain any agreement by Oryx to
pay rent directly to the lender.17 The subordination agreement did refer-
ence the assignment of leases in the deed of trust, although Oryx was not
a party to the deed of trust. The deed of trust gave Santa Fe a license to
collect the rents unless the bank terminates the license as a result of an
event or default. The dispute centered on whether or not the license had
been revoked. The court held that there was a contested fact issue that
made summary judgment in favor of the lender improper.' 8 The lender
also argued that the assignment of leases was absolute and, therefore, a
revocation of the license was unnecessary. The court found the assign-
ment required affirmative action on the part of the lender, so it was a
pledge instead of an absolute assignment. 19 The court noted the assign-
ment did not even allow Oryx to make rent payments directly to the
bank.20 Because the terms of the deed of trust were susceptible to more
than one meaning, it was ambiguous 'and summary judgment was
improper.2'
WTFO, Inc. v. Braithwaite22 involves a suit for deficiencies remaining
after non-judicial foreclosure sales. The Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration ("FDIC") conducted foreclosures on properties subject to two
separate deeds of trust which secured two separate promissory notes exe-
cuted by the borrower. WTFO subsequently acquired the notes and sued
the borrower for the deficiencies. The borrower filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment alleging that notice of the foreclosure sales was not given
15. 1& at 412.
16. Id. at 413.
17. Id. at 414.
18. Id. at 417.
19. 895 S.W.2d at 415.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 417.
22. 899 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no writ).
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pursuant to the deeds of trust and section 51.002 of the Property Code.23
The court detailed the rather sloppy notification on the part of the FDIC,
sending two demand letters in July of 1990 to an incorrect address and
then correcting the error by remailing both letters in the same envelope
to a correct address a few weeks later. The foreclosure sales were con-
ducted by the FDIC the next year. According to the record, the FDIC
sent no other notices of the sales. WTFO attempted to controvert the
borrower's affidavit, but its summary judgment proof was not filed until
four days prior to the summary judgment hearing. Because the trial court
did not grant leave for the late filing, the court of appeals did not consider
WTFO's summary judgment proof. The trial court's summary judgment
for the borrower was affirmed. 24
A new section was added to the Tax Code regarding loans secured by a
lien on land used for agriculture.25 The amendment prohibits lenders
from requiring that a borrower waive its right to claim or apply for an
agricultural exemption as a condition to granting or amending the terms
of a real estate loan. The lender may, however, require the borrower to
pay into an escrow account an amount equal to the additional taxes and
interest that would be due should a change of use occur which eliminates
the agricultural exemption. The escrow account must accrue interest
monthly. The proceeds may be used to pay additional taxes and interest
resulting from a loss of the exemption, but any balance must be refunded
to the borrower. Funds in the escrow account are refunded to the bor-
rower when the loan is paid in full.26
B. VENDOR PURCHASER
1. New Legislation
In 1995 the legislature found that contracts-for-deed are frequently uti-
lized to allow low income persons to purchase property in colonias and
substandard housing developments, since these individuals lack access to
traditional financing and the assistance of professional builders.2 7 Under
the contracts-for-deed arrangements, the statutory law did not ensure (1)
that information such as the availability of utilities, flood plain informa-
tion or encumbrances of title are disclosed to purchasers; (2) that the con-
tract is properly recorded to provide notice to subsequent creditors; (3)
that legal title is properly transferred; or (4) that the purchaser's equity in
the property is protected. For these reasons, the contract-for-deed pur-
chaser faces problems requiring statutory protection. As a result, Sub-
chapter D of Chapter 5 of the Property Code was amended to provide
statutory protection for purchasers under contracts-for-deed.
23. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
24. WTFO, Inc., 899 S.W.2d at 721.
25. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.47 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
26. Id §§ 23.47, 23.58.
27. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Legis., R.S., ch. 994, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen Laws 4982, 4982
(codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.062 (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
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Significantly, the amendments to section 5.062 require notices of de-
fault to state in plain language any remedies the seller intends to enforce
against the purchaser, and specifically state the contract term violated by
the purchaser and any action necessary to cure the violation.28 Addition-
ally, Subchapter E was added to Chapter 5 of the Property Code, relating
to requirements for executory contracts for conveyance applicable to cer-
tain counties. This subchapter is applicable to areas that the Texas De-
partment of Housing and Community Affairs find have per capita income
twenty-five percent below the state average and are within 200 miles of
an international border.29 Sellers must disclose to purchasers the prop-
erty's condition by providing a survey, legible copies of any documents
that describe encumbrances or other claims, and a statutory notice listing
items such as the availability of utilities, road maintenance and the exist-
ence of liens against the property.30 Violations of the notice requirement
by sellers is both a violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act 31 and
entitles purchasers to cancel or rescind the executory contract.32 A seller
must also disclose all financing terms to the purchaser, including the
purchase price, interest rate, estimate of the dollar amount of interest,
total amount to be paid, late charges to be assessed, if any, and the fact
that the seller may not charge a prepayment penalty if the purchaser pays
early.33 The seller may not impose additional late fees exceeding eight
percent of the monthly payment or the actual administrative costs of
processing late payments, pledge the purchasers' interest as security for
loans, or impose prepayment penalties if the purchaser makes early pay-
ments under the contract. 34
The purchaser may cancel or rescind the executory contract for any
reason by providing notice by telegram or certified/registered mail, or de-
livering a written notice in person, not later than the fourteenth day after
the date of the contract. 35 The contract-for-deed must contain a notice to
the purchaser that the purchaser has a right of cancellation. 36 The seller
has the responsibility of recording the executory contract and any instru-
ment that terminates that contract. 37 The Act also limits a seller's reme-
dies in default. Where a purchaser defaults after paying forty percent or
more of the amount due, or the equivalent of forty-eight monthly pay-
ments, the seller may sell, through a trustee, the purchaser's interest in
the property, although the seller may not enforce any remedies through
rescission, forfeiture or acceleration.38 The seller must notify a purchaser
28. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.062(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
29. Id. § 5.091(a).
30. Id. § 5.094(a).
31. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1987).
32. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.094(d) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
33. Id. § 5.095.
34. Id § 5.096.
35. Id. § 5.097.
36. Id. § 5.097(d).
37. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.099 (Vernon 1996).
38. Id. § 5.101(a).
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of default and allow sixty days to cure the default. 39 Where a purchaser
defaults before paying forty percent of the amount due or forty-eight
monthly payments, the seller may enforce remedies of rescission or for-
feiture and acceleration.40
2. Case Law
The Survey period saw few landmark developments in vendor/pur-
chaser law. In Humphrey v. Camelot Retirement Community4' plaintiff
attempted to purchase a home from defendant builders. The defendants
began constructing the house, but the purchaser died before she and the
builders could close on the home. Subsequently, the purchaser's estate
informed the builder that it had defaulted on the earnest money contract
by failing to timely deliver a title policy to the purchaser and demanded
return of the earnest money.42 The appellate court found that the
builder's failure to deliver a commitment for title insurance (or title
binder) within thirty days of the date of the earnest money contract was a
breach that went to the essence of the contract and supported rescission
in favor of the purchaser.43
Galveston Terminals, Inc. v. Tenneco Oil Co.44 began with Galveston
Terminal's agreement to sell a portion of Pelican Island in Galveston,
Texas to Tenneco Oil Company. The agreement included an option con-
tract with a right of first refusal. If Tenneco were to sell any or all of the
tract, it must first offer the tract to Galveston Terminals at the same
price. 45 Fina Oil acquired title to the tract in 1989 without notice to Gal-
veston Terminals. Fina signed an earnest money contract to sell the tract
to another defendant who then assigned its rights to Tatsumi U.S.A.
Corp. Fina informed Galveston Terminals they had agreed to sell the
property to Tatsumi.46 Galveston Terminals brought suit alleging breach
of the right of first refusal, and seeking specific performance. The de-
fendants argued that none of the transactions constituted a "sale" as re-
quired by the right of first refusal. Tenneco argued that it had formed a
subsidiary, to which it transferred real property including the tract on Pel-
ican Island. Tennecco maintained it and Fina entered into a stock
purchase agreement with the sale of 100 percent of the subsidiary's stock
to Fina. Thus, Fina took control of the subsidiary, which at that time
owned the Pelican Island tract. Fina then had all the assets of the subsidi-
ary distributed to itself as a liquidating dividend to its sole shareholder,
by which Fina acquired title to the tract.47 The defendants argued the
39. Id. § 5.101(b).
40. Id. § 5.101(g).
41. 893 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
42. Id. at 57-58.
43. Id. at 59.
44. 904 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
45. Id. at 788.
46. Id. at 789.
47. Id. at 789-90.
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acquisition was not a sale of real property. The court disagreed, finding
that Tenneco had the burden of proving that there was no election to sell
the real estate on Tenneco's part. Without adequate proof, a summary
judgment in favor of Tenneco was improper, and the court reversed it.48
In Pfluger v. Clack49 the court considered whether a seller could con-
tractually force a purchaser to close when the purchaser raises a clear title
defect omitted by the title company in its commitment letter.50 The court
began by noting that the purchasers did have a valid objection to title
because while they were conveyed the surface estate, including water
rights, the water rights had previously been severed and conveyed in a
separate transaction.51 The court then determined that the contractual
language in the title commitment allowed the buyer to make objections to
defects not covered in the commitment after the commitment had been
issued.5 2 Finally, the court concluded that the title objections were timely
raised. The court concluded that the 1965 water reservation effecting title
was a previously undisclosed title defect, and, thus, the purchasers were
not provided with copies of all documents creating exceptions to title.
Therefore, the objection was timely raised. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court's holding that because the sellers could not convey good
and marketable title or furnish title insurance to guarantee good and in-
defeasible title, the purchasers were entitled to terminate the contract.5 3
C. USURY
The following usury cases are the ones the authors consider to be most
significant during the Survey period. In Dunnam v. Burns,54 the court
noted that the four-sentence instrument evidencing appellant's indebted-
ness to appellee was "not a model of drafting precision."'55 The instru-
ment provided exactly as follows:
The officers of Tornado Shelter Inc. on this date 8/23/88, did borrow
$35,000.00 from Mr. Ken Burns, Jr. They agree to pay the entire
balance plus $5,000.00 by 2/23/89. The officers put up as collateral; 1-
36 ft. gooseneck trailer, 1-24 ft. gooseneck trailer, 4-16 ft. trailers, 5
fiberglass molds. There are no liens [sic] on the above assets.56
The issue was whether the $5,000 additional sum contained in the
promissory note constituted interest.5 7 If you represent lenders you are
48. Id. at 792.
49. 897 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, writ denied).
50. Id. at 959.
51. Id at 959-60.
52. Id. at 961. Two separate paragraphs of the commitment were implicated. One
referred to a buyer's objections to previously undisclosed exceptions, while the other re-
ferred to title objections raised by the buyer. The court held that such paragraphs would
be rendered meaningless if the purchaser could not raise title objections after the title
commitment had been issued.
53. Id. at 962.
54. 901 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no writ).
55. Id. at 629.
56. Id at 634.
57. Id. at 631.
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definitely pulling for the appellee in this case, since the promissory note's
effective rate of interest was 28.57%. Nonetheless, the appellee argued
that he did not "charge" interest because the instrument was drafted by
appellant and because appellee was only interested in collecting the prin-
cipal amount of the note. What can we learn from this case? First, "[t]he
drafter of the usurious promissory note is simply irrelevant. '58 Once a
lender agrees to a loan transaction providing for usurious interest, the
lender has "charged" such interest and subjected itself to the law of
usury. The next question then is how severe the penalty? There is no
stated rate of interest in the promissory note. If no rate is stated, then the
maximum amount of interest which is allowed is 6% per annum. 59 But if
the parties agree to an interest rate, then the maximum rate chargeable is
18% per annum.60 The court noted that "[a]n 'agreed interest rate' does
not have to be specified as a numeric rate" so long as the promissory note
provides the following three required elements: (1) the total amount of
interest; (2) the amount of principal; and (3) the duration of the loan in
which case interest rate may be calculated.61 Because the note at issue
provided the three required elements, the court considered the ceiling to
be 18% and not 6%. What if this had been a demand note with no stated
maturity date?
In Coxson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Co. of America62 the Coxsons,
Chapter 13 debtors, brought suit against First Nationwide Bank and
Commonwealth, the loan servicing agent and holder of a promissory note
executed by the plaintiffs in connection with the purchase of a residence
in Dallas, Texas in March, 1974. The note was secured by the house and
lot purchased. The lender considered the plaintiffs in default of their pay-
ment obligation and wanted to foreclose. The plaintiffs sought to prevent
foreclosure of their home. One of the arguments made by the plaintiffs
to delay foreclosure was that the note executed by them violated the
Texas Usury Law. 63 The plaintiffs also claimed that the loan documents
executed in connection with the purchase of their residence violated the
Federal Truth in Lending Act ("TILA").64 The Bankruptcy Court held
that the applicable statutes of limitations barred the usury and TILA
claims.
The Coxsons appealed to the district court which determined that the
usury and TILA claims were not barred by applicable statutes of limita-
tions. Nonetheless, the court determined that the note was not usurious
under Texas law. The court did, however, find merit in the TILA claim
and awarded the plaintiffs a $2,000 offset against the debt.
58. Id. at 632.
59. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1987).
60. Id. art. 5069-1.04.
61. Dunnam, 901 S.W.2d at 632.
62. 43 F.3d 189 (5th Cir. 1995).
63. Id at 190.
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13, 1631-48, 1671-77 (1994).
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Going into the court of appeals, the Coxsons were "hitting" 2 for 3, i.e.,
they prevailed on their TILA claims, and stalled the foreclosure. The
court of appeals provided a brief historical overview of the regulation of
interest rates in Texas which has its roots in the Texas Constitution. 65 The
court noted that "[t]he provisions of legislature's usury statute are not as
clear-cut as the Constitution. '66 I would suggest that this is a proverbial
understatement. The usury issue in Coxson is whether a contract is usuri-
ous if it has no express provision for the refund or credit of unearned
interest which would otherwise render the contract usurious upon the oc-
currence of some contingency. The contingency in Coxson is the applica-
tion of the note's acceleration clause which would render the entire debt,
including principal and unearned interest, due upon the borrower's de-
fault.67 The unearned interest contemplated refers to various closing fees
which the court noted are considered interest in Texas which could render
the interest rate usurious if the note were accelerated early in its term,
and there was no usury savings clause. The court compared the facts in
Coxson with those in Smart v. Tower Land & Investment Co. 68 In Smart
the court noted that "unless the contract by its express and positive terms
evidences an intention which requires a construction that unearned inter-
est was to be collected in all events, the court will give it the construction
that the unearned interest should not be collected." 69 In Smart the con-
tract specifically provided for the collection and retention of unearned
usurious interest. However, in Coxson the contract is silent on the issue
of whether such interest should be refunded or credited to the principal
of the debt in the event of acceleration. The court relied on Walker v.
Temple Trust Co.70 in applying the general rule that courts interpret con-
tracts in a way the parties intended; here the intention was that the
unearned interest would not be retained at foreclosure. Thus, even if the
contingency materialized, the lender would not get more than the lawful
rate of interest, which the court determined the contract was not usuri-
ous. In Coxson, Commonwealth argued on appeal that the district court
erred in allowing the Coxsons to assert their TILA claim defensively and
recoupment against the note, thereby avoiding a one year statue of limi-
tations for TILA actions. The TILA expressly provides:
[a]ny action under this section may be brought... within one year
from the date of the occurrence of the violation. This subsection
does not bar a person from (sic) asserting a violation of this. sub-
chapter in an action to collect the debt which was brought more than
one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation as a matter
of defense by recoupment or set-off in such action, except as other-
wise provided by State law.71
65. Coxon, 43 F.3d at 191.
66. Id.
67. See Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 787 (Tex. 1977).
68. 597 S.W,2d 333, 341 (Tex. 1980).
69. Id.; see also Coxon, 43 F.3d at 192.
70. 124 Tex. 575, 80 S.W.2d 935, 937 (1935).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1994).
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Commonwealth argued plaintiffs' TILA claim was not a defensive re-
coupment action. The court relied on the definition of "recoupment" as
defined in Ballantine's Law Dictionary, which provides:
[T]he right of a defendant, in the same action, to cut down the plain-
tiffs demand even because the plaintiff has not complied with some
cross obligation of the contract on which he sues or because he has
violated some duty which the law imposes on him in the making or
performance of that contract. 72
The United States Supreme Court has held that recoupment is in the
nature of a defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon
which the plaintiff's action is grounded. 73 Such a defense is never barred
by the statute of limitations so long as the main action itself is timely.
Commonwealth argued that the Coxsons' TILA claim was not raised de-
fensively since the Coxsons initiated the law suit. The Coxsons relied on
the theory that the best defense is a good offense. The district court
noted that the Coxsons filed the suit in response to Commonwealth's fil-
ing of the proof of claim in the Bankruptcy Court and its foreclosure ac-
tions. The district court considered the filing of a proof of claim as an
action to collect the debt, and therefore the TILA claim was timely. The
court noted that the mere fact that the Coxsons were the plaintiffs in the
case below does not preclude the finding that the TILA claim was raised
defensively, thus proving up the Coxsons' theory. The court noted that
this is consistent with other Texas cases holding that a TILA claim may be
asserted defensively as a recoupment action against the lender attempting
to enforce contractual obligations. 74
In Ginsburg 1985 Real Estate Partnership v. Cadle Co.,75 the Court re-
minds us that (1) it is okay to use an analogous prime rate in the event of
an unforeseeable "benchmark" bank failure; (2) that usury is a personal
defense and may not be asserted by a guarantor; and (3) a decision by a
corporation's board of directors is not required before the corporation
has the authority to execute a guaranty. In this case, Ginsburg 1985 Real
Estate Partnership (the "Partnership") executed a promissory note paya-
ble to Republic Bank-Tyler. The note specified an interest rate equal to
the prime interest rate charged by Republic Bank-Dallas plus 1%. First
Republic Bank-Dallas, the successor to Republic Bank-Dallas, was de-
clared insolvent and placed into receivership; First Republic Bank-Tyler,
successor to Republic Bank-Tyler, failed and was placed into receiver-
ship. The note and several guaranties securing payment of the note were
purchased by what is now known as NationsBank of Texas, N.A. (the
"Bank"). A dispute arose between the Bank and the Partnership regard-
ing the allocation of payments on the note between principal and interest
72. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICIONARY 1070 (3d ed. 1969).
73. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935).
74. See Cooper v. Republic Bank, 696 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no
writ); Garza v. Allied Fin. Co., 566 S.W.2d 57, 62-63 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978,
writ denied).
75. 39 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 1994).
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and allegedly the Bank advised the Partnership to cease making pay-
ments until the dispute could be resolved. Thereafter, the Bank trans-
ferred the note to the FDIC who then sold it to the Cadle Company.
Cadle requested payment on the note and made demand upon the guar-
antors. The Partnership filed suit seeking damages for usury, negligence,
gross negligence and breach of contract. The district court granted Ca-
dle's motion for summary judgment and awarded Cadle the outstanding
principal amount of the note, together with accrued interest at the default
rate of 18% per annum.76 The Partnership and the guarantors argued
that when First Republic Bank-Dallas failed, its prime interest rate failed
to exist and therefore the maximum rate of interest was 6% which is the
rate permitted pursuant to Article 5069-1.03 when no specified rate of
interest is agreed upon by the parties.77 The Partnership argued since
Cadle charged more than 6% interest, there must be a statutory usury
violation. For purposes of determining interest accrued on the note, Ca-
dle calculated interest at the 18% default rate but additionally calculated
interest by referring to the NationsBank prime rate. The court noted that
Cadle's "substitution" approach, or its application of a "continuing" in-
terest rate, was supported by Texas law and precedent in the Fifth Circuit.
The court provided a summary of a prior Fifth Circuit case 78 noting that
Texas law favors continuity in the rate of interest. The Partnership appar-
ently wanted the court to distinguish between the rate of a "successor"
bank and that of a "non-successor" bank (NationsBank not being consid-
ered a legal successor of First Republic Bank-Dallas) for purposes of de-
termining the applicability of the 6% interest rate ceiling. The court,
however, focused on the fact that the "continuing" rate need only be an
analogous rate. Notwithstanding that the Court did not find a usury vio-
lation, it nonetheless considered the arguments by the guarantors of the
Partnership note. The court, citing Houston Sash & Door v. Heaner,79
noted that in Texas a guarantor may not assert usury defenses that stem
from the underlying principal obligation.80
Perhaps the most significant discussion coming out of this case relates
to the validity of the guaranty agreement executed by a corporate guaran-
tor. The corporate guarantor argued that without a corporate resolution
by which the Board of Directors determines that the guaranty benefits
the corporation, it cannot be assumed that the corporation possesses au-
thority to execute the guaranty.8' Article 1302-2.06(B) provides that
"[t]he decision of, or a decision made pursuant to authority granted by,
the Board of Directors that the guaranty may reasonably be expected to
benefit, directly or indirectly, the guarantor of corporation shall be bind-
76. Id. at 537.
77. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1987).
78. FDIC v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1990).
79. 577 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1979).
80. Id.
81. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06(B) (Vernon 1980).
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ing upon the guarantor of corporation. ... ",82 Cadle contended that a
decision by the Board of Directors is not required before the corporation
has the authority to execute a guaranty and the court agreed. The court
noted that the language of the statute does not indicate that a Board deci-
sion or resolution is mandatory. The court does point out, however, that
a Board decision will provide a lender with a guaranty enforcement




In Bluebonnet Savings Bank v. Grayridge Apartment Homes, Inc.84 the
court of appeals absolved the lender from a jury verdict which found that
it was grossly negligent in misrepresenting that a delinquent loan would
be refinanced. This litigation resulted when the lender sued Grayridge
Apartment Homes and Mr. Harry, the guarantor, for a deficiency judg-
ment after it foreclosed on its deed of trust on the Grayridge Apartments.
Grayridge and Harry filed a counterclaim against the lender which the
jury upheld by awarding actual damages of $158,000 and exemplary dam-
ages of $474,000. The court of appeals reversed, in part, and rendered the
trial court's judgment. Justice Cohen stated that to prove negligent mis-
representation, a claimant must show:
1. that the informant supplied false information in a pecuniary
transaction;
2. that the information was supplied for the guidance of others in
their business transactions;
3. that the claimant justifiably relied upon this information;
4. that the claimant suffered a pecuniary loss; and
5. that the informant failed to exercise reasonable care or com-
petence in obtaining or communicating the information to the in-
jured party.85
After reviewing all of the evidence, the court found that there was no
evidence of justifiable reliance by a reasonable business person. The
court specifically pointed out the fact that during settlement negotiations,
the lender's representative and Mr. Harry executed a document entitled
"Settlement Negotiations Agreement" in which the parties agreed as
follows:
This meeting was held for the purposes of settlement negotiations
and in the interest of open and frank discussions. All of the parties
agreed that such discussions were in the context of settlement negoti-
ations, and that none of the discussions or communications at the
82. Id.
83. Cadle, 39 F.3d at 535 (citing Kerry W. Conner, Enforcing Commercial Guaranties
in Texas: Banishing Limitation, Remaining Questions, 12 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 785, 800
(1981)).
84. 907 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
85. Id. at 908.
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meeting could be introduced by either party against the other party
in any litigation.86
The court also noted Mr. Harry's considerable experience in real estate.
It is possible that, in the absence of these two factors, the court would
have upheld the verdict. In another victory for the lender, the court re-
manded the cause to the trial court to determine the amount of the judg-
ment because the jury found the deficiency to be "none".
Lighthouse Church v. Texas Bank87 demonstrates the inadvisability of a
lender taking possession of real property prior to a foreclosure, especially
when that action is not authorized by the loan documents. In Lighthouse
Church, a defunct corporation acquired certain real property from Texas
Bank in exchange for a note, a deed of trust covering the property, and a
security agreement. The Church subsequently defaulted on its payments
to Texas Bank. On January 16, 1992, the bank entered the property,
locked out the Church, and posted a guard on the premises. Two months
later they conducted a non-judicial foreclosure of the property. The
Church and David Montgomery, individually and doing business as three
separate entities, sued Texas Bank alleging trespass, conversion of real
and personal property, and wrongful foreclosure. The plaintiffs appealed
the granting of a summary judgment by the trial court in favor of Texas
Bank. The court of appeals first considered the plaintiffs' standing to
bring the claims. A corporation which has forfeited its corporate charter
cannot maintain a suit in state court.88 Likewise, a party who fails to file
an assumed name certificate cannot maintain a suit in a Texas court under
that name.89 Texas Bank, however, waived these defects by failing to file
a motion to abate the cause of action. The bank also claimed that Mont-
gomery had no standing to sue since the bank's contract was with the
church. The court, however, pointed out that trespass, conversion and
wrongful foreclosure sound in tort. No contractual relationship is neces-
sary.90 The court next considered the bank's attack on the conveyance.
Texas Bank argued that the deed to the defunct corporation was void,
therefore, the bank still owned the property and had the right to take
possession. The court found otherwise. While a deed to a grantee that
does not exist at the time the deed is executed is void, because the corpo-
ration had a statutory right to have its corporate charter reinstated, it was
not wholly extinguished as a legal entity.91 The court found the deed was
not void. The court went on to say that even if it were void, there is no
support for the proposition that one may unilaterally declare a deed void
without resorting to the courts for a determination of its status. In other
words, the bank had no legal right to repossess the realty until a court
declared the deed void.
86. Id. at 909.
87. 889 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
88. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.252(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
89. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 36.10(a) (Vernon 1987).
90. Lighthouse Church, 889 S.W.2d at 600.
91. Id. at 600-01.
19961 1295
SMU LAW REVIEW
The bank also argued that there was no trespass since the Texas Busi-
ness and Commerce Code ("UCC") and the bank's security agreement
granted the right to repossess collateral by entering the premises if possi-
ble without a breach of the peace. The court pointed out that Chapter 9
of the UCC and the provisions of the security agreement apply only to
personal property. The court held that seizure of real property prior to
foreclosure is not condoned by Texas law, except where the property is
voluntarily relinquished by the debtor.92 The court went on to say that
even if a contractual, self-help repossession is authorized, the bank's loan
documents contained no such agreement. The security agreement did not
cover real property (only personal property) and the deed of trust con-
tained no clause authorizing the bank to take possession of the realty
prior to foreclosure. Just when the plaintiffs thought they were on a roll,
the court stated that it could not address the wrongful foreclosure claim
because it was not properly assigned as a point of error. The court af-
firmed that part of the summary judgment relating to wrongful foreclo-
sure and reversed and remanded the balance of the case.
2. New Legislation
New legislation was passed which covers deeds in lieu of foreclosure.
The holder of a debt who accepts a deed conveying real property in satis-
faction of the debt may void the deed before the fourth anniversary of the
execution of the deed and instead foreclose under the original deed of
trust if (1) the debtor did not disclose a lien or encumbrance on the prop-
erty to the debt holder and (2) the debtholder had no personal knowl-
edge of the undisclosed lien or encumbrance.93 An affidavit regarding
the voiding of the deed is conclusive as to a third party. The holder may
foreclose its deed of trust with or without voiding the deed. 94
Another amendment added a new chapter to the Property Code which
covers the forced sale of an owner's interest in real property as reim-
bursement for property taxes paid by the co-owner. If a person owns an
undivided interest in non-exempt property received as a result of the
death of another person (excluding a survivorship agreement between
spouses for community property), he may file a petition in the district
court for an order requiring the other undivided interest owner to sell his
interest to the petitioner if (1) the petitioner has paid the other owner's
share of ad valorem taxes on the property for any three years in a five
year period and (2) the other owner has not reimbursed the petitioner for
more than half of the total amount paid by petitioner on the other
owner's behalf.95 The court is authorized to enter an order that divests
the defendant's interest in the real property and that orders the petitioner
to pay to the defendant an amount computed by subtracting the outstand-
92. Id. at 602-03.
93. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.006 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
94. Id.
95. Id. §§ 29.001-.004.
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ing amount the defendant owes to the petitioner for taxes from the fair
market value of the defendant's interest in the property as determined by
an independent appraiser appointed by the court. The court may also
order the defendant to execute and deliver to the petitioner a deed con-
veying the defendant's interest in the property.96
II. HOMESTEAD
First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales97 presents Part III of the continu-
ing saga of First Gibraltar's attempt to obtain a judicial declaration that
portions of the Texas homestead law have been statutorily preempted by
federal law. For those with short-term memory problems, Part I was the
Fifth Circuit's conclusion that federal law preempts Texas homestead law
as it relates to two alternative mortgage instruments-the reverse annuity
mortgage and the line of credit conversion mortgage. 98 Part II was the
passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act of 199499 (the "Amendment"), which purported to limit the authority
of the Office of Thrift Supervision to preempt any homestead provision
of any state. In the latest installment, Gibraltar appealed to the Fifth
Circuit attacking the constitutionality of the Amendment. Despite admi-
rable arguments on the part of First Gibraltar, the Fifth Circuit, in a mer-
cifully brief opinion, held the Amendment to be constitutional. The court
declined to accept First Gibraltar's unique argument that the Amend-
ment could not "resurrect" homestead law which had already been pre-
empted on the date of the Amendment's enactment. The court explained
that because the Texas homestead laws had not been repealed, they were
still in effect outside of the context of federal bank regulation. Once the
agency's preemption authority was removed, the Texas homestead provi-
sions, already in affect in other areas, were resurrected in the area of
federal bank regulation.
Crowder v. Benchmark Bank'00 is an important case, and its holding
resulted in a change in the law regarding liens on homesteads. Crowder
converted his sole proprietorship to a corporation in 1983. Unfortunately
for Crowder, the corporation's 1984 corporate withholding taxes were
paid under the sole proprietorship's tax identification number and, even
more unfortunately, the corporation failed to pay withholding taxes in
1985. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") filed tax liens against
Crowder and the corporation in 1985 and 1986. Crowder obtained a loan
from Benchmark to pay the IRS taxes. Mr. and Mrs. Crowder signed a
note payable to Benchmark and a deed of trust purporting to create a lien
against the Crowders' urban homestead consisting of 1.85 acres of land.
96. Id.
97. 42 F.3d 895 (5th Cir. 1995).
98. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales, 19 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 204 (1994) (opinion vacated and substituted by 42 F.3d 895 (1995)).
99. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994).
100. 889 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ granted).
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After the note became delinquent, Benchmark foreclosed on the
Crowders' homestead. There was no segregation prior to the foreclosure
of the exempt one acre from the excess. The Crowders sued Benchmark
for wrongful foreclosure and breach of contract claiming (1) that Bench-
mark did not have a valid lien because Benchmark was not subrogated to
any lien against the homestead, and (2) only the federal government
could foreclose a federal tax lien against a homestead. The trial court
granted Benchmark's motion for summary judgment and denied the
Crowders' motion. After reviewing the Texas Constitution' 0 ' and the ap-
plicable Texas statute,102 the Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution permits only the fed-
eral government to enforce its nonproperty tax liens against Texas home-
steads.103 Although the IRS could have foreclosed its tax lien, the court
held that "a private party cannot obtain or enforce a government's lien
that is contrary to the Texas Constitution, Texas statutes, or Texas public
policy. As a matter of law, Benchmark did not have a valid and enforcea-
ble lien interest against the Crowders' one-acre homestead."' 0 4 The
court also upheld the Crowders' argument that prior to foreclosure,
Benchmark was required to segregate the exempt part of the homestead
from the nonexempt part, if the party asserting the homestead right failed
to do so voluntarily. 0 5 "If the property cannot be partitioned, only that
percentage attributable to the nonexempt property should be offered for
sale .... A foreclosure sale conducted on an unsegregated estate is a
nullity."' 10 6 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
The ruling in Crowder led to Senate Bill 1032, which amends Section
41.00 of the Texas Property Code and Section 50, Article XVI of the
Texas Constitution. 0 7 As we learned from Crowder, a homestead is pro-
tected from forced sale except for purchase money, taxes against the
property itself, and improvements to the homestead. This amendment
adds the following to that list of exceptions:
(1) an owelty of partition imposed against the entirety of the
property by court order or by written agreement of the parties to the
partition, including a debt of one spouse in favor of the other spouse
resulting from a division or award of a family homestead in a divorce
proceeding; and
(2) a refinance of a lien against a homestead, including a federal
tax lien resulting from the tax debt of both spouses, if the homestead
101. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
102. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(b)(2) (Vernon 1984).
103. Crowder, 889 S.W.2d at 528.
104. Id. at 529.
105. Id. at 530 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.021-.023 (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
106. Id. (citing Mallou v. Payne & Vendig, 750 S.W.2d 251,255,257 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, writ denied)).
107. Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 121, § 2.01 Tex. Gen. Laws 933, 933 (to be
codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
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is a family homestead, or from the tax debt of the owner.'08
In addition, this amendment addresses prior adverse decisions holding
that a false non-homestead affidavit does not estop the owner from later
claiming the property is homestead. The amendment provides that a pur-
chaser or lender for value without actual knowledge may conclusively
rely on an affidavit that designates other property as the homestead of
the affiant and that states that the property to be conveyed or encum-
bered is not the homestead of the affiant.
III. DEEDS
Burgess v. Easley'0 9 involves the examination of a deed executed by
the grantor during the marriage of the grantee and his spouse to deter-
mine whether the property conveyed is the community property of the
grantee and his spouse or the separate property of the grantee. On July
28, 1980, Michael Easley's parents executed and acknowledged a deed
that conveyed certain property to Michael for and in consideration of ten
dollars. Michael and Emma were married on January 25, 1980, and di-
vorced on May 18, 1984. When Emma subsequently discovered the exist-
ence of the deed, she sued Michael to partition the overlooked
community property. The court of appeals pointed out that to be effec-
tive, an instrument conveying real property must be "subscribed and de-
livered" by the conveyor. 110 "Without evidence to the contrary, the law
presumes a grantor delivers a deed on the date of execution and acknowl-
edgement.""' Michael's father testified that the conveyance was a gift,
that the deed was never delivered to Michael, and that it was not re-
corded until July 18, 1984. "Recording the deed constructively delivered
the deed to Michael.""112 Emma objected to the testimony about the deed
because the deed itself is unambiguous. The court held that while extrin-
sic evidence may not be admitted to modify the terms of an unambiguous
deed, testimony is admissible to show the time of delivery. Because
Michael's rights in the deed did not vest until after the divorce, the prop-
erty was not community property subject to partition. Emma also struck
out when it came to her attorney's fees. The trial court's decision not to
award attorney's fees to Emma was approved by the appellate court.
IV. TENANCY IN COMMON
In In re Thurrond'13 the court examined various relationships, how-
ever, only those dealing with real property are discussed here. In 1989,
Mr. and Mrs. Thurmond moved to Texas and purchased a home for
$198,809. The down payment in the amount of $53,809, or 27.07% of the
108. Id.
109. 893 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
110. Id. at 90 (citing TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.021 (Vernon 1984) (emphasis added)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 91.
113. 888 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied).
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purchase price, came from a testamentary trust created by Mr. Thur-
mond's father, i.e., Mr. Thurmond's separate property. The remaining
portion of the purchase price was paid by what the court referred to as
community debt. Nonetheless, this community debt was paid exclusively
out of the separate property income of the trust. In 1991, Mrs. Thurmond
filed a petition for divorce in which she sougiht, among other things, a
division of community property. The trial court awarded exclusive pos-
session of the parties' residence to Mrs. Thurmond until the emancipation
of the minor child. The court ordered at that time that the house was to
be sold and 40% of the proceeds were to go to Mr. Thurmond and 60%
to Mrs. Thurmond. The trial court noted that Mr. Thurmond failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that any separate property reim-
bursement was due or that he had any separate property interest in the
house. The court noted that when both separate and community re-
sources are used to acquire property during the marriage, Texas courts
have consistently referred to the relationship between the separate es-
tates and the community estates as a "type of tenancy in common." 114
The court further noted that Texas courts have variously referred to the
rights of the spouses' separate estate as a "pro tonto ownership," 115 "a
part interest," 116 "equitable title," 117 "separate interests,"" 8 and "con-
structive trust."" 9 The court in Thurmond preferred to characterize the
separate estate as that of an "equitable title" thus following Goddard.
The court noted that equitable title is a property right, greater than a
right of reimbursement. As a property right it may not be divested from
a spouse at divorce without violating our state constitution.12o The court,
citing Cockerham v. Cockerham,12' noted that it is well established in
Texas that when a spouse uses separate property to acquire property dur-
ing marriage, and takes title of that property in the names of both
spouses, a presumption arises that the purchasing spouse intended to
make a gift of one-half of the separate funds to the other spouse. Texas
law does not recognize a gift by a spouse to the community estate, thus to
the extent there is a presumption of a gift, it must be to the other spouse.
The presumption is rebuttable, however Mr. Thurmond was unable to
rebut the presumption and thus Mrs. Thurmond ended up with the
13.535% separate property interest which under equitable title is an un-
114. Id. at 272 (citing Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d. 881, 883-84 (1937); see
also Cook v. Cook 679 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ); Carter v.
Grabeel, 341 S.W.2d 458, 462 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, no writ)).
115. Thurmond, 888 S.W.2d at 272 (citing Broussard v. Tian, 156 Tex. 371, 295 S.W.2d
405, 406 (1956), cert. denied sub nom., 353 U.S. 941 (1957)).
116. See Gleich, 99 S.W.2d at 883.
117. See Goddard v. Reagan, 28 S.W. 352, 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1894, no
writ).
118. Cook, 679 S.W.2d at 583.
119. Maxie v. Maxie, 635 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ
denied).
120. See Eggemayer v. Eggemayer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex. 1977).
121. 527 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. 1975); see also Graham v. Graham, 836 S.W.2d 308, 310(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ).
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divestable property right. It was not a total loss for Mr. Thurmond; he
retained a 13.535% separate property interest, and was entitled to a reim-
bursement for payments of community debt made out of his separate es-
tate. Mr. Thurmond did not, however, raise the issue of reimbursement,
and therefore did not receive any. If you read the full text of this case
you will note that, in fact, Mrs. Thurmond wanted the house to be charac-
terized as community property; thus from the court's perspective it was
Mr. Thurmond who could not be divested of his separate property inter-
est. You should also note from the record that the estimated value of the
house at the time of trial was $406,000 or a $207,000 (approximately) in-
crease in value from the time of purchase, a very nice gift to Mrs.
Thurmond.
V. EASEMENTS
If you read last year's survey you learned (or at least had your memory
refreshed) that an easement in gross is personal to the grantee only and is
generally not assignable or transferrable. An easement appurtenant is an
easement interest which attaches to the land and passes with it. An ease-
ment is never presumed to be in gross when it can fairly be construed to
be appurtenant. Walchshauser v. Hyde,122 was an appeal from a declara-
tory judgment finding the plaintiff did not have an easement appurtenant
for ingress and egress across property belonging to the appellees. Appel-
lant purchased his land (which had an airplane hanger on it) from Lincoln
Financial, Inc. Appellant's contract with Lincoln specified that the
hanger building must have access to the runway. Lincoln knew this was
no problem since it had obtained a default judgment against the same
appellees, awarding Lincoln an ingress and egress easement from the Lin-
coln property to the Hyde property. The judgment provided that Lin-
coln's easement "shall run with the land and this judgment shall have the
same force and effect as a fully warranted grant or conveyance of such
easement."'1 23 The deed from Lincoln to appellant in this case did not
specifically describe the easement but did convey any "appurtenances
thereto in anywise belonging."'1 24 The appellees contended that the ease-
ment obtained by Lincoln was a nonassignable easement in gross not an
easement appurtenant. The appellees' argument was based, in part, upon
their assertion that there is no legal description of the land over which the
easement runs because the default judgment that granted the easement
referred to the property description as that described on the attached Ex-
hibit "A," and there was no Exhibit "A" attached to the default judg-
ment. The court noted that although there is no Exhibit "A" attached to
the default judgment, there is a property description with the default
judgment and the court records. The court held that the property de-
scription with the default judgment is the Exhibit "A" referred to by the
122. 890 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).




default judgment even though it does not bear that notation on its face.
Thus the court found that the judgment does contain a legal description
of the land subject to the easement that was granted to Lincoln. 2 5 The
appellees, relying on the cases of Greer v. Greer126 and McWhorter v. City
of Jacksonville,127 argued that an instrument conveying real estate is void
under the Statute of Frauds unless the real estate description is so definite
and certain upon the face of the instrument itself, or in some other writ-
ing referred to, the land can be identified with reasonable certainty. The
court noted, however, that even though the Exhibit "A" to which the
default judgment refers is not attached, it is nonetheless a part of record.
The ultimate holding in this case is that appellees' arguments just won't
fly.
In Bennett v. Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement District No.
One,128 the court determined that the appellants were all wet. Unfortu-
nately, in this case being all wet must be taken in its most literal context.
The appellant land owners sued the appellee for damages to their land
which is encumbered by flowage easements owned by the Water District.
The flowage easements permit the Water District to flood the landown-
ers' property without incurring liability. The landowners purchased their
respective tracts of land, predominantly encumbered with flowage ease-
ments, with the intent to use the tracts for residential or recreational pur-
poses. The landowners alleged several causes of action including inverse
condemnation, misrepresentation, fraud, abandonment of the easements,
and deceptive trade practices. The only discussion here will b6 in connec-
tion with the construction of the deeds conveying the property to the
landowners and the flowage easements. The landowners argued that the
flowage easements are invalid and void as against public policy. They
further argued that the flowage easements conflicted with the property
restrictions limiting use of property to one single family resident per tract.
The court, noting that the rules applicable to the construction of deeds
are also applicable to the construction of easements, 29 referred to its pri-
mary duty as deemed to ascertain the intent of the parties by a fundamen-
tal rule of construction known as the "four corners" rule.' 30 The court
effortlessly dismissed the landowners' arguments that the flowage ease-
ments are invalid because they conflict with the landowners' fee simple
ownership rights and their use of the property for single family residential
purposes. There is nothing extraordinary about the way the court han-
dled the construction issue. What is interesting about this case is the fact
125. Id. at 173-74.
126. 144 Tex. 528, 191 S.W.2d 848, 849 (1946).
127. 694 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. App.-'Iyler 1985, no writ).
128. 894 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
129. Id. at 446 (citing Jones v. Fuller, 856 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, no
writ) and Boland v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 816 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1991, no writ)).
130. Id. (citing Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991); Cherokee Water Co.
v. Forderhouse, 641 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex. 1982) and Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 299
S.W.2d 904, 906 (1957)).
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that in validating the Water District's flowage easement, the court noted
that public policy strongly favors the Water District's use of the flowage
easements in connection with the State's duty to prevent floods and take
steps necessary for the conservation of natural resources.13'
VI. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
A. NEW LEGISLATION
During the Survey period, the legislature created a procedure to amend
existing property restrictions on subdivisions. 132 The legislature found
that homeowner's associations enjoyed a special relationship with prop-
erty owners within subdivisions, that subdivisions needed a procedure to
easily facilitate increases in the amount of assessments for the benefit of
the associations, and that restrictions on regular assessments were detri-
mental to the maintenance of subdivision common area facilities. 33 Sub-
sequently, Chapter 204 was added to the Property Code.
Chapter 204 is entitled "Powers of Property Owners' Association Re-
lating to Restrictive Covenants in Certain Subdivisions." The chapter is
applicable to residential real estate subdivisions, excluding condominium
developments, in counties with a population with 2.8 million or more. 34
The chapter is applicable regardless of a restriction's effective date. 35
The chapter is also inapplicable to subdivision areas that are zoned for or
contain commercial structures, industrial structures, apartment com-
plexes or condominium developments. 36 The chapter provides a means
of extending, adding or modifying restrictive covenants; restrictions con-
tained in documents which have their own means of extending, adding or
modifying restrictive covenants take precedence over these statutory pro-
visions.' 37 The chapter allows the extension, addition or modification of
existing restrictive covenants if both the homeowner's association circu-
lates a petition which is approved by the owners of at least seventy-five
percent of the real property in the subdivision or a smaller percentage
required by a dedicatory instrument, and the petition is filed as a dedica-
tory instrument with the county clerk of the county in which the subdivi-
sion is located.' 38 Once approved, the petition is binding on all
properties in the subdivision or section. 39 Modified restrictions are bind-
ing on lienholders, except for restrictions relating to regular or special
assessment increases if the assessment is not subordinated to purchase
131. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59.
132. Act of May 27, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1040, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 5170, 5171
(amending TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. by adding chapter 204).
133. Id.
134. T x. PROP. CODE ANN. § 204.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
135. 1d § 204.002(b).
136. Id. § 204.002(c).
137. Id. § 204.003.
138. Id. § 204.005(b).
139. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 204.005(d) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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money or home improvement liens. 140 The petition may be adopted by
written ballot, meeting of the homeowner's association held with written
notice, door-to-door circulation of the petition, on any means permitted
by the existing restrictions or a combination of these methods.14'
B. CASE LAW
In Simms v. Lakewood Village Property Owner's Ass'n 142 a developer
filed a plat for a subdivision named Lakewood Village, which was
designed for mobile homes, modular homes and recreational vehicles.
Each contract conveying property in the subdivision included language to
the effect that each purchaser read and accepted various restrictive cove-
nants and property assessments by the subdivision.' 43 In 1984 the devel-
oper, with the assistance of homeowners, formed an advisory board to
advise and assist with the management of the subdivision. The advisory
board handled the collection of assessment fees and the management of
common areas in the subdivision. Restrictive covenants were recorded in
1987, and the developer turned the subdivision over to Harlingen Na-
tional Bank in 1988. The bank gave the association management and
ownership of the property's common areas, and shortly afterward the
homeowner's association signed articles of incorporation and elected a
board of directors."
One year later, a homeowner filed suit against the association claiming
they were charging assessments based on the number of houses built,
rather than the number of lots owned by each property owner in violation
of the restrictive covenants. After an agreed judgment was entered, the
association began to make assessments based on the number of lots
owned. At that time, homeowners who had houses built on multiple lots
brought suit claiming the homeowner's corporation was illegally em-
ployed, had no authority to accept management or control over the com-
mon areas, had no authority to levy assessments and that the
homeowners had no actual notice of the restrictive covenants. 145 The ap-
pellate court determined that the homeowner's corporation was formed
appropriately because the developer declared in the covenants that it
would transfer management and ownership of the subdivision's common
areas to a homeowner's association. The covenants, through use of the
word "may," gave the developer discretion in choosing when and how he
would turn control of the subdivision over to a homeowner's associa-
tion.146 Thus, the homeowner's association formed by the developer, was
consistent with the restrictive covenants regarding subdivision
140. Id. § 204.007(a).
141. Id. § 204.008.
142. 895 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied).
143. Id. at 782.
144. Id.
145. Id.




The court next found that the association had authority to accept man-
agement and ownership of the common areas, since the record did not
reflect that the appellant homeowners voted against the formation of the
homeowner's association. Additionally, no homeowner challenged the
formation of the homeowner's association until two years after it ac-
cepted management and ownership of the property.148 The failure to ob-
ject provided some evidence of acquiescence and ratification of the
association's management over the property.149
The court found that the bank gave up its right to levy assessments or
its authority to assess against the subdivision. While the bank maintained
ownership of the property, it was the actual "declarant" which transferred
its rights to the incorporated association to make assessments. It was not
bound by the prior developers' acts and, in fact, was the instigator for the
formation of a homeowner's association. Thus, the court held that the
bank's action in transferring management and ownership of the property
to the association granted authority to make assessments on each lot in
the subdivision.'50
Finally, the homeowners argued that although there was a set of re-
strictive covenants in place, numerous violations of those restrictions oc-
curred within the subdivision, indicating a waiver of the restrictive
covenants. Such violations included the construction of brick homes in
areas restricted to mobile or modular homes, mobiles homes located in
recreational vehicle areas, waivers of assessments, the failure to properly
use an architectural control committee, and the construction of buildings
across lot lines. 15' The court agreed that there had been violations of the
restrictive covenants, however, the court could equitably overlook any
waiver or abandonment of subdivision plans if there was a benefit to the
original plan that could still be realized. Thus, the court was forced to
weigh the equities in favor of maintaining the plan against the equities in
favor of waiver.'52 The court found evidence that the developer had used
the restrictions in his promotional literature to attract purchasers. There
was evidence that some purchasers bought their property in reliance on
the restrictive covenants. There was evidence that the general scheme
and plan of the subdivision had been followed. Finally, there was evi-
dence that after incorporation, the homeowner's association regularly
met and made assessments; the association also frequently made repairs
to the subdivision. Thus, the court agreed with the trial court's finding
that any acts in violation of the restrictive covenants did not waive those
covenants or restrictions. 53
147. Simms, 895 S.W.2d at 784.
148. Id
149. Id. at 784-85.
150. Id. at 785.
151. Id-
152. 895 S.W.2d at 786.
153. Id. at 787-88.
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In Ashcreek Homeowner's Ass'n v. Smith,154 a homeowner's associa-
tion sought damages and attorney's fees for violations of deed restrictions
where a homeowner's basketball goal lacked a backboard and his fence
had a broken slat. The trial court granted a motion for summary judg-
ment in favor of the homeowner. The subdivision argued that the trial
court abused its discretion by refusing to liberally construe restrictive
covenants to find that the unrepaired fence and basketball goal were nui-
sances. In 1987, the Supreme Court of Texas in Wilmoth v. Wilcox 155 de-
clared that restrictive covenants are to be strictly construed against the
party seeking to enforce them. The subdivision argued that Property
Code section 202.003(a), which requires that restrictive covenants be lib-
erally construed to give affect to their purpose and intent, reversed Wil-
moth. The Ashcreek court disagreed, holding that there is no conflict
between liberally construing a covenant to give effect to its purpose and
strictly construing the covenant against the party seeking to enforce it.156
The subdivision sought to have the court declare that its notice of viola-
tion, while not specifically mentioning a broken fence slat and faulty bas-
ketball goal, still gave fair notice under nuisance provisions; with liberal
construction of the nuisance and notice requirements, proper notice
would have been given. The court disagreed, claiming strict construction
of the notice requirements is necessary, and thus the trial court had not
abused its discretion by ruling in favor of the homeowner. 157
VII. ZONING
A. NEW LEGISLATION
In the wake of NAFTA, the Texas legislature has addressed the
problems of undeveloped subdivisions along the U.S.-Mexico border.
The legislature found that conditions along the border have "resulted in a
proliferation of substandard housing developments in which the lack of
basic infrastructure has caused a serious and unacceptable health and
safety risk.' 158 To provide counties with the ability to cancel high-risk,
low-development subdivisions, provisions were created for the cancella-
tion of subdivisions where land remains undeveloped over time.159 These
provisions deal with real property, located outside municipalities, defined
as an "affected county" under the Water Code,160 and along an interna-
tional border. 16' Commissioner's courts are allowed to cancel, after no-
tice and hearing, a subdivision platted before September 1, 1989, if
development of improvements in the subdivision were not started before
154. 902 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
155. 734 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. 1987).
156. Ashcreek, 902 S.W.2d at 589.
157. 902 S.W.2d at 589-90.
158. Act of May 16, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 277, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2617, 2618
(amending TEX. Loc GOV'T CODE ANN. § 232.0085).
159. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 232.0085 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
160. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 16.341 (Vernon 1995).
161. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 232.0085(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
[Vol. 491306
REAL PROPERTY
June 5, 1995, and the commissioner's court finds by resolution that the
land is likely to be developed as a colonia. 162 At the hearing, the court
may not rescind or cancel a subdivision if the cancellation interferes with
the rights of a person who is a nondeveloper owner, unless the person
agrees to the cancellation, or the owner of the entire subdivision can
show that the owner is able to comply with the minimum standards estab-
lished in the Water Code 163 where the land was developed or improved
between September 1, 1989 and June 5, 1995.164
B. DEDICATION
The City of Stafford v. Gullo165 involved two developers who owned six
acres of land in Stafford, Texas. They sold 4.6 acres of that land to Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., but they neglected to have a subdivision approved by
the City. Stafford ordinances forbid subdivision of land unless a plat has
been approved by the City Planning Commission, and the Commission
may not issue permits to improve lands without a plat. 166 The developers
conceded that their sale of land to Wal-Mart was a subdivision and sub-
mitted plats to the City. The City then conditioned its approval of the
subdivision upon the developers' dedication of a right-of-way to the City
and their payment for the costs of widening streets adjacent to the devel-
opment. Rather than dedicating the right-of-way or providing a bond for
construction costs, the developers brought suit and sought a summary
judgment contending that Stafford ordinances did not authorize the City
to condition platting upon the dedication of a right-of-way or the devel-
opers' payment of construction costs. 16
7
Although cities may regulate the platting and subdivision of land, the
municipality may only require dedication of land if it is authorized by
constitutional, statutory or charter authority.' 68 The court held that sec-
tion 17-144 of the Stafford Ordinances was inapplicable because the City
was not authorized to require the provision of a right-of-way greater than
one hundred feet when there was already a right-of-way in existence in an
adjacent thoroughfare. 169 The court also held that a general ordinance
162. Id. § 232.0085(b). The term "colonia" is undefined in the Act.
163. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 16.343 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
164. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 232.0085(d) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
165. 886 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
166. Id. at 524.
167. Id
168. Id.
169. Section 17-144(b) states:
the minimum width of the right-of-way to be dedicated for any designated
major thoroughfare shall not be less then 100 feet. In those instances where
the proposed subdivision is located adjacent to an existing major thorough-
fare having a right-of-way less than 100 feet, sufficient additional right-of-
way must be dedicated to accommodate the development of the major thor-
oughfare in question on the basis of a total right-of-way width of 100 feet.
Where the construction of concrete pavement with curbs, gutters and storm
sewers as determined by the planning commission and the council to be not
feasible and open-ditch drainage is therefore required, the minimum right-of-
way width required for the development of a designated major thoroughfare
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with allowed the City to require developers to pay for improvements
which were necessary to provide adequate streets to the subdivision was
limited by section 17-144(b), which limited the amount of right-of-way
that could be required when a proposed subdivision is adjacent to an ex-
isting major thoroughfare, as was the case for the developers.170 Thus,
the court concluded that the City's own ordinances did not allow them to
condition platting upon dedication of an additional right-of-way or the
payment for construction costs; in fact, the City's ordinances prevented
such a conditioning.
Bowen v. Ingram17' involved an alleyway easement within and adjacent
to a subdivision and whether that alleyway was limited to utility purposes
or could be used as a public street. In 1972, the subdivision developer
executed a "Dedication of Alleyway and Easement" which dedicated a
utility easement. The easement was dedicated for the use, enjoyment and
benefit of landowners in the subdivision adjacent to the strip of land, as
well as the use, benefit and enjoyment of the public generally. It was also
for the use and benefit of any public utility, municipality or other person
or firm furnishing gas, water, electricity or other utilities. When the de-
veloper later conveyed the subdivision to its residents, the conveyance
excepted the alleyway and easement dedicated in 1972.
The landowners in the subdivision argued that the dedication instru-
ment was a mere offer of dedication, which was not accepted by the
county before the landowners perfected title by limitation. Relying on
Biscardi v. Pagestka,172 the court held that express acceptance of dedica-
tion is unnecessary; instead, implied acceptance is sufficient. 173 Addition-
ally, the court noted that the dedication instrument referred to the use of
the public generally prior to a conjunctive reference to a utility usage.
Finally, the instrument noted that utility installations could not be con-
structed to interfere with the free passage of public vehicles across the
easement. The court rejected the appellants contention that their con-
struction of a fence across the easement gave them title by limitations,
noting that Article 5517 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated
specifically includes alleys as public areas which cannot be lost by adverse
possession. 74
shall be more than 100 feet and of sufficient width to accommodate the ap-
proved roadway pavement and attendant drainage facilities.
STAFFORD, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 17, art. VC, § 17-144(b).
170. 1l
171. 896 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ).
172. 576 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. 1978).
173. 896 S.W.2d at 334 (citing Biscardi, 576 S.W.2d at 19).





In condemnation proceedings, the condemning authority often relies
upon appraisal reports in determining what amount to offer a landowner.
Now the governmental entity seeking to acquire real property for a public
use must disclose to the landowner, when an offer to purchase is made,
any and all existing appraisal reports "produced or acquired by the gov-
ernmental entity relating specifically to the owner's property and used in
determining the final valuation offer."'1 75 Likewise, within ten days of
receiving the government's appraisal reports (but no later than ten days
prior to the special commissioner's hearing) the property owner must dis-
close to the acquiring entity any and all existing reports produced or ac-
quired by the landowner relating to that owner's property used in
determining the owner's valuation. 176 These provisions do not apply to
acquisitions for which a governmental entity does not have eminent do-
main authority.177 Additionally, the statute does not require the disclo-
sure of an appraisal report not in existence when an offer to purchase was
made, appraisal reports not used in determining a final valuation offer, or
reports not specifically related to the property sought to be acquired.
Furthermore, the amendment is not retroactive to offers to purchase
made before August 28, 1995.178 In 1995 the Texas legislature also
amended the government code by adding the Private Real Property
Rights Preservation Act.179 The Act applies to the taking of real prop-
erty through the adoption or issuance of an ordinance, rule, regulatory
requirement, resolution, policy, guideline, acts that impose a physical in-
vasion or require a dedication or exaction of private real property, acts of
municipal annexation which are not uniform throughout the annexing
municipality. 180 Where the Act applies, governmental immunity is
waived, and the government extends permission to sue to real property
owners, although the Act does not authorize persons to execute judg-
ments against property of the state or a governmental entity.181 To deter-
mine whether there has been a taking of private property, a property
owner may bring suit under the Act against a governmental entity in dis-
trict court in the county in which the property is located' 82 or bring ad-
ministrative proceeding against a state agency.183 The question of a
governmental taking is a question of fact, and the property owner is only
175. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.0111(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
176. Id. § 21.0111(b).
177. Id.
178. Act of May 26, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch 566, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3362, 3363.
179. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2007.001-.045, 2002.011 (Vernon Supp. 1996); TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 23.11 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
180. Id. § 2007.003(a).
181. Id. § 2007.004.




entitled to invalidation of the governmental action or taking.184 Once a
final decision or order is entered based upon a fact finding, the govern-
mental entity may elect to pay damages to the property owner rather
than invalidate its taking, in which case governmental immunity to liabil-
ity is waived. 185
B. CASE LAW
In Aquila Southwest Pipeline Corp. v. Gupton186 the court addressed
the sufficiency of a property description in a condemnation petition. The
sufficiency of the description is a jurisdictional issue. 187 A description is
sufficient if it is such that "a surveyor, or other person skilled in such
matters, could take such description and definitely locate the same on the
ground.' i8 8 Essentially, the description must be sufficient to be recorded
in a deed.189 In Aquila there were two separate property descriptions:
one for a temporary construction easement and one for a permanent con-
struction easement. The court found that the temporary construction
easement description was vaguely pleaded; however, vague pleading of
the temporary easement did not affect the sufficiency of pleading for the
permanent easement. The description of the permanent construction
easement was sufficient, and thus "the vagueness of the description of the
temporary easement did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the
whole case."'190
In another case, State v. Schmidt,'9' the court addressed the question of
whether the state was required to pay costs of court when a property
owner whose property had been condemned prevailed at trial. The prop-
erty owners had rejected the State's original offer to purchase the prop-
erty, and in fact, the administrative tribunal found the owners' damages
to be more than twice the State's offer.192 At trial, the owners were
awarded slightly less than the tribunal's offer but considerably more than
the State had offered. The trial court adjudged all costs of the proceed-
ings against the State.193 The State argued that the Property Code was
184. TEx. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 2007.023 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
185. Id. § 2007.024(c).
186. 886 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
187. Id. at 501.
188. Id. (citing City of Dallas v. Megginson, 222 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
189. Id. at 501-02.
190. Id. at 502 (emphasis in original). Additionally, the court held that the temporary
construction easement was sufficiently described to gave the property owners notice of the
general location of the temporary easement and provided them an opportunity to decide
exactly what area the temporary easement would cover, and thus it was sufficient. Id.
191. 894 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ).
192. Id. at 544.
193. Id. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.047(a) (Vernon 1994) provides as follows:
Special commissioners may adjudge the costs of an eminent domain proceed-
ing against any party. If the commissioners award greater damages than the
condemnor offered to pay before the proceedings began or if the decision of
the commissioners is appealed and a court awards greater damages than the
commissioners awarded, the condemnor shall pay all costs. If the commis-
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ambiguous, unless the trial court could divide costs between the parties,
assessing a portion to the State and the remainder to the property own-
ers. The court disagreed stating that the obvious purpose of section
21.047(a) is to encourage the State to offer the true value of the land and
discourage the property owner from making extravagant demands.194 As
a result, the court held that the statute requires a comparison of the
amount recovered to the amount offered before condemnation proceed-
ings begin.195 Thus, if the owner recovers more than the condemnor of-
fered, the condemnor is required to pay all costs, and no apportioning is
necessary or even allowed. 196
In State v. Carlton197 a condemnee objected to a special commissioner's
award regarding the valuation of his property. Shortly before trial, the
condemnee then attempted to file a non-suit and motion asking the trial
court to render judgment and award him the value of his property as
established by the special commission, which the trial court did. The ap-
pellate court held that with the filing of objections and service of citation
on the adverse party, here the state, the administrative proceeding was
ended and there could be no reinstatement of the commissioner's award.
Despite the condemnee's attempts to non-suit his case, there was no ab-
solute right to reinstate the relief awarded by the special commis-
sioner.198 Additionally, the appellate court noted that by requesting that
the trial court render judgment on the commissioners' award, the con-
demnee was seeking affirmative relief; this was inconsistent with styling
his motion to dismiss and render judgment as a non-suit. A similar result
was reached one week later in State v. Martini.199
IX. MECHANIC'S LIENS
In Crest Construction, Inc. v. Murray2°° Jim Murray acted as a concrete
subcontractor under Crest on three different projects. Due to serious
health problems, Mr. Murray walked off the three jobs. Mr. Murray sub-
sequently accepted an unsecured note from Crest in settlement of all
claims on one of the projects and in return executed a lien waiver.
"Thereafter, Mr. Murray passed away-a very regrettable calamity."'201
In spite of the waiver, his widow filed a lien affidavit on the project which
prevented Crest from being paid by the general contractor. Crest sued
Mrs. Murray for tortious interference with Crest's contract with the gen-
sioners' or the court's determination of the damages is less than or equal to
the amount the condemnor offered before proceedings began, the property
owner shall pay the costs.
194. 894 S.W.2d at 545.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 901 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ).
198. Id. at 738.
199. 902 S.W.2d 138, 141-43 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
200. 888 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994), rev'd per curiam, 900 S.W.2d 342
(Tex. 1995).
201. 888 S.W.2d at 951.
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eral contractor. Mrs. Murray counterclaimed on a quantum meruit the-
ory. The jury found in favor of Mrs. Murray on all of her claims. In a
lengthy opinion by Justice Brookshire, the Beaumont Court of Appeals
reversed the jury verdict, holding that (1) a written waiver and release of
a mechanic's lien, if supported by consideration (which can include a
promise from the party benefiting from the release) is absolute and irrev-
ocable, and (2) the term "contract" should not be whispered, spoken or
written in a case that involves a claim of quantum meruit or that theory
will be "eviscerated and disemboweled. '20 2 The supreme court, in a very
brief opinion, stated that Crest repudiated the settlement agreement
when it indicated that it would not perform on the promissory note when
its performance became due. "Once Crest repudiated the Beaumont set-
tlement agreement, Murray was under no obligation to honor the waiver
of lien. When a claim is released for a promised consideration that is not
given, the claimant may treat the release as rescinded and recover on the
claim. '203 Because Murray had the legal right to file a mechanic's lien on
the project, Crest could not, as a matter of law, prevail on its tortious
interference claim.204 The supreme court went on to state that generally
a party may not recover under quantum meruit when there is an express
contract. Construction contracts, however, are an exception to this
rule.2 05 Even though Murray breached the express contract, he could
bring an action in quantum meruit to recover the amount of benefits con-
ferred to Crest by Murray's partial performance.20 6 The judgment of the
court of appeals was reversed and rendered in favor of Mrs. Murray.
Lively v. Carpet Services, Inc.20 7 presents a case of first impression re-
garding the exclusivity of the remedies provisions of the Texas Construc-
tion Trust Fund Act20 8 (the "Act"). CSI was the carpet subcontractor on
several projects for which Lively's corporation, Wayward, was the general
contractor. CSI was not paid and Wayward filed for protection under
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. CSI did not perfect a
mechanic's lien on the projects or file a claim in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing, but instead, sued Lively under the Act. Lively appealed after the
trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of CSI. Lively first ar-
gued on appeal that the penalty provision of the Act is the exclusive rem-
edy for violations under the statute. The court of appeals overruled that
point and held that civil liability exists if (1) the duty imposed by the Act
has been breached, and (2) the plaintiff is within the class of people the
Act was designed to protect and has asserted the type of injury the Act
was intended to prohibit.209 The court reasoned that "[t]he mere fact that
202. Id. at 938.
203. 900 S.W.2d at 344.
204. Id. at 345.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 904 S.W.2d. 868 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
208. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 162.001-.003 (Vernon 1995).
209. 904 S.W.2d at 873.
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a statute provides for criminal punishment or for the payment of money
as a penalty to one aggrieved, does not by itself prevent the imposition of
liability. ' 210 Although the Act does not expressly provide for a private
right of action, it does not specifically exclude civil liability. Lively next
argued that he should not be held individually liable. The court held that
the sole owner and officer of a corporation, such as Lively, can be individ-
ually liable. "The Act defines 'trustee' as a 'contractor, subcontractor, or
owner or an officer, director, or agent of a contractor, subcontractor, or
owner, who receives trust funds or who has control or direction of trust
funds.' ' 211 Lively's third point was that the claim violated the automatic
stay provisions of the bankruptcy code. Because a third party can enforce
the fiduciary duty created by the Act directly against the individual of-
ficer of the bankrupt corporation, the automatic stay provisions of the
bankruptcy code are inapplicable.212 The court went on to overrule
Lively's next point by holding that intent to defraud is not an element of
a civil cause of action under the Act. Unfortunately for CSI, the sum-
mary judgment affidavit of Lively stated that the funds were used to pay
actual expenses directly related to the construction and office overhead
associated with the construction projects. The court found that the Act
does not prohibit the use of construction trust funds for overhead and
other directly related expenses. Because Lively's sworn affidavit created
a fact issue as to what Lively did with the funds, the court reversed and
remanded the case. It is interesting to note that Justice O'Connor dis-
sented on the last point of error stating that Lively's sworn affidavit con-
tained only conclusions and not facts.213 The court ruled that Lively's
affidavit did not create a fact issue.
The requirements pertaining to involuntary liens for architects, engi-
neers or surveyors were revised in the last legislative session. The amend-
ment deleted the requirements that (1) a written contract be recorded
with the County Clerk where the land is situated; and (2) the work prod-
uct must be used in the actual construction of the project.214 Only a writ-
ten contract is required. Lien inception is the date of recording of a lien
affidavit and lien priority is determined by date of recording. The lien is
not valid or enforceable against a grantee or purchaser who acquires an
interest in the real property before the time of the inception of the lien.
215
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.002 (Vernon 1995) (emphasis added by
court)).
212. Id.
213. Id at 876-77 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
214. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021(c) (Vernon Supp. 1996).





In 1995 the legislature sought to protect tenants from the disconnection
of utility services. The Property Code was amended to prevent the land-
lord's interruption of water, wastewater, gas or electric service furnished
to a tenant by the landlord, unless done as the result of bona fide repairs,
construction or emergency.216 If electrical service is individually metered
or submetered for the tenant's unit, is in the landlord's name, and the
landlord complies with Public Utility Commission of Texas Rules for Dis-
continuance of Submetered Electrical Service, the landlord may discon-
tinue electrical service to the tenant. 217 Where the electrical service is not
individually metered for the tenant, the landlord may interrupt service if
the connection is in the landlord's name, the tenant is at least seven days
late in rental payments, and the landlord mailed or hand-delivered to the
tenant a written notice.218 The written notice must state the first date of
interruption, the amount to be paid to prevent interruption and the name
and location of the entity to whom payment is to be made, on or before
five days before the date the service is to be interrupted, if the interrup-
tion does not begin before or after the landlord's normal business hours
or a day immediately preceding a day when the landlord is unavailable to
accept rent and restore service. 219 Once the tenant tenders rental pay-
ments, the landlord must restore electrical service within two hours.
220
The landlord's violation of this section will result in the tenant's recovery
of possession of the premises or the option to terminate the lease, and
recovery from the landlord of an amount equal to the tenant's actual
damages, one month's rent or $500, whichever is greater, reasonable at-
torney's fees and court costs, less any delinquent rents.
22
'
Two other statutes have been enacted, one of which is designed to en-
sure tenant safety. During the Survey period, the legislature amended
the Smoke Detection Provision of the Property Code which require land-
lords to place and maintain in good working order proper smoke de-
tecting equipment.222 Additionally, the legislature has amended the
Property Code concerning a landlord's ability to lock out tenants in resi-
dential leases. 223 In the lock out situation, landlord must place a written
notice on the tenant's door stating an on-site location where the tenant
may recover a key twenty-four hours a day, state that the landlord must
provide a new key to the tenant whether delinquent rent is paid or not,
and the amount of rent and other charges for which the tenant is delin-
216. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.008(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
217. Id. § 92.008(c).
218. Id. § 92.008(d).
219. Id.
220. Id. § 92.008(e).
221. Id. § 92.008(f).
222. See generally TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 92.258-.2611 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
223. Id. § 92.0081.
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quent.2 24 In essence, lock out is no longer a viable remedy for landlords,
since the tenant may not actually be locked out for failure to pay rent,
and lock out is only a threat which the tenant may remedy by requesting
a key.
B. IMPLIED WARRANTY OF SUITABILITY
In Davidow v. Inwood North Professional Group,225 the Supreme
Court of Texas recognized the existence of an implied warranty of suita-
bility by commercial landlords. 226 The court held that a tenant's obliga-
tion to pay rent is mutually dependent upon the landlord's implied
warranty of suitability of the commercial premises. 227 In Neuro-Develop-
mental Associates v. Corporate Pines Realty Corp.,228 the court of appeals
addressed the question of whether a tenant must establish damages from
a landlord's breach of the implied warranty of suitability for the tenant to
have a defense for failure to pay rent. In Neuro-Developmental Associ-
ates, the tenant was delinquent in rents in the amount of approximately
$13,700. The landlord sued for the outstanding rentals, and the tenant
counterclaimed and established the defense that the commercial premises
were not suitable for their commercial purposes, which was a breach of
the implied warranty of suitability.229 The trial court submitted a ques-
tion regarding breach of the implied warranty of suitability for commer-
cial purposes which combined the concept of breach and producing cause.
The tenant argued that since breach of the implied warranty alone was
enough to justify the withholding of rent, it was not required to show any
damages or causation of damages resulting from the breach of the im-
plied warranty of suitability. The appellate court agreed, holding that be-
cause Davidow recognized that the obligation to pay rent and the implied
warranty are mutually dependent, "[i]t is illogical that the tenant would
bear the additional burden of proving damages to avoid liability. '230
Thus, it is held that a tenant need only prove a breach of the implied
warranty of suitability, rather than breach and damages therefrom, to es-
tablish a defense to failure to pay rent.
Compare the pre-emption in Gilstrap v. Parklane Townhome Ass'n.231
In Gilstrap a one-year-old child died in a condominium fire. The condo-
minium was leased to his mother and the defendant townhome associa-
tion was not the owner, lessor nor sublessor of the unit. Plaintiff brought
causes of action alleging negligence, gross negligence, breach of implied
warranty of habitability, and violations of the DTPA for failing to install a
224. Id. § 92.0081(c).
225. 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1988).
226. Id at 377.
227. Id.
228. 908 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
229. Id. at 27.
230. Id. at 28.
231. 885 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, no writ).
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smoke detector in the condominium.232 The townhome association
claimed that these causes of action were pre-empted by the Texas Prop-
erty Code, which states "[t]he duties of a landlord and the remedies of a
tenant under this subchapter are in lieu of common law, other statutory
law and local ordinance regarding a residential landlord's duty to install,
inspect or repair a smoke detector in a dwelling unit. '233 In response,
plaintiff maintained that the child was not a tenant, since he did not re-
side in the townhome, and the association was not a landlord, but rather a
homeowner's or condominium owner's association, and thus the pre-
emptive language did not apply. The association argued that the legisla-
ture clearly intended to pre-empt smoke detector claims against associa-
tions which do not own, occupy, control or make repairs to
condominiums, since those same claims are pre-empted against landlords
who do have control over the condominiums. The court disagreed hold-
ing that since the Property Code chapter in question "applies only to the
relationship between landlords and tenants of residential property," 234
the townhouse association failed to prove that it was entitled to pre-emp-
tion under the Texas Property Code provision barring common law
claims by tenants against landlords. 235 Thus, the court ruled that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment for the townhouse association
based upon the pre-emptive language of the Texas Property Code.
C. PREMISES LIABILITY
Stein v. Gill236 is a premises liability case in which a duplex owner
leased the downstairs level of the duplex to a tenant, and that tenant
slipped on two stairs leading from a sliding glass door in her apartment to
a deck behind her apartment which resulted in a broken leg. She sued
the owner for failure to maintain the steps, failure to provide hand rails
and failure to provide a non-slip surface. The owner moved for summary
judgment claiming that the steps were not a common area but were for
the tenant's exclusive use; consequently, he owed no duty to the ten-
ant.237 The court noted that generally a landlord retaining control over
premises owes a duty to exercise ordinary care; although when the land-
lord transfers possession and control of the premises to the tenant, he
owes no further duties to the tenant. 238 The court held that since the
steps were only a means of access to the tenant's apartment and deck,
they did not constitute a common area; they were part of the leased prop-
erty over which the tenant had exclusive control and possession. Conse-
quently, the landlord owed no duty to the tenant, unless he failed to
232. Id. at 590.
233. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.252(a) (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1996).
234. Id. § 92.002.
235. 885 S.W.2d at 591.
236. 895 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1995, writ denied).
237. IMt at 501.
238. I. at 502.
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disclose a hidden defect with the allegedly defective steps.239 Thus, the
court indicates factual limits to removing liability from landlords in in-
stances of leased residential premises over which the tenants have exclu-
sive control and possession.
Moreno v. Brittany Square Associates240 involved a plaintiff who fell on
stairs inside her apartment. She filed suit against the apartment and man-
agement company for negligence and failure to provide rails on the stair-
way. The apartment complex and management company moved for
summary judgment based upon plaintiff's failure to comply with the no-
tice provisions of Chapter 92 of the Texas Property Code.241 While the
plaintiff conceded she did not provide the appellees written notice of the
alleged property defect, she claims this was unnecessary because the
Property Code notice requirements are inapplicable to personal injury
claims based upon common law negligence. The court held that section
92.061 was not meant to limit or preclude causes of action for personal
injury related to dangerous conditions on a leased property. In fact, a
plaintiff could never give notice of a hidden defect because the plaintiff
would be unaware of such a hidden defect. Thus, the Property Code does
not prohibit personal injury claims for failure to give notice.2 42
In Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler243 the plaintiff in the trial court had
been attacked and kidnapped from the parking garage of her highrise
condominiums. She later filed suit against the highrise's marketing unit,
Centeq, as well as the homeowners' association maintaining that they
were negligent in failing to provide adequate security at the condomini-
ums. She alleged that Centeq, the marketing agent, owned, controlled
and/or managed the premises and was an agent for owner in the daily
operation of the premises.244 The court noted that in a landlord/tenant
relationship, the landlord who retains control over the safety and security
of the premises owes a duty to a tenant's employee to use ordinary care
to protect that employee against foreseeable and unreasonable risks of
harm from criminals acts of third parties. 245 The court noted that a
homeowners' association is a separate legal entity from the unit owners,
thus the court declined to apply something akin to an alter ego theory
and hold that the homeowners' association was a mere "conduit" through
which Centeq exercised power over security decisions. While Centeq did
have power to elect the majority of the board of the homeowners' associ-
ation, the court found that control was independent from any control
over security. Centeq had no power to make security decisions and thus
had no specific control over the security of the premises.2 46
239. Id at 503.
240. 899 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
241. Id. at 261.
242. Id at 263.
243. 899 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. 1995).
244. Id at 196.
245. Id. at 197.
246. Id. at 198-99.
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D. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
Kennedy v. Highland Hills Apartments247 involved a situation in which
an apartment complex was trying to evict an indigent tenant. The tenant
paid $31.00 per month in rent because she received federal assistance. In
the initial trial, the county court entered a default judgment in favor of
the complex because the appellant failed to appear. On April 11, she
filed a motion for a new trial which was granted, and the case was reset.
On that same date, she deposited a $31.00 check for her April rent,
although the rent was due on April 1. At trial, the apartment complex
filed a notice of default alleging that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
749b(2) required the writ deposit be made within five days of the due
date, or on or before April 6. The court determined that appellant failed
to comply with Rule 749b and entered a default judgment. The tenant
filed a pauper's affidavit to perfect her appeal.
The tenant maintained that the funds required by Rule 749b are super-
sedeas in nature and relate only to the issue of possession of the premises;
Rule 749b does not authorize default judgments.248 The court noted that
forcible entry and detainer proceedings are intended to be summary,
speedy and inexpensive. 249 Where the basis for default is the nonpay-
ment of rent, a tenant who appeals by filing a pauper's affidavit under
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 749a is entitled to remain in possession of
the premises during the appeal if the tenant properly follows Rule 749b.
That Rule requires that the tenant pay into the court registry one month's
rent within five days of filing a pauper's affidavit and continue to pay rent
as it becomes due into the court registry within five days of the due date.
Where the tenant fails to make timely payments into the court registry,
the landlord may file a notice of default in the county court, and that
court shall issue a writ of restitution. Since the purpose of Rule 749b is to
prevent an indigent appellant from maintaining possession of the prem-
ises during the appeal, Rule 749b(3) allows that failure to make payments
into the registry of the court prevents the tenant's entitlement to maintain
possession of the premises during the appeal. That Rule does not, how-
ever, expressly authorize the county court to enter default judgments.
Additionally, Rule 753 only allows the. entry of default judgments against
a defendant in forcible detainer actions when no answer has been made
in the justice or county court. Since the indigent appellant filed a written
answer, the court could not enter a default judgment and was limited to
entering only a writ of restitution dispossessing the tenant during the pen-
dency of the appeal.250
In ICM Mortgage Corp. v. Jacob,251 Jacob entered into a lease with
property owners, whose property was later purchased at a foreclosure
247. 905 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no writ).
248. Id. at 326.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 328.
251. 902 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
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sale by ICM Mortgage. Upon learning of the foreclosure, Jacob ex-
pressed to ICM her desire to continue living in the premises or purchase
the property. ICM brought a forcible entry and detainer action against
the prior owners and told Jacob that they could not sell her the property
or discuss renting the property to her until after that action was com-
pleted. Eventually, a writ of possession was provided to ICM by the jus-
tice court, and a few days later, without notice to Jacob, the locks on her
doors were changed and her possessions were moved out of the house.
Thereafter, she was allowed to make an offer to purchase the home.252
Jacob brought suit against ICM alleging negligence and gross negligence
in obtaining and executing a forcible entry detainer judgment against her
leased residence.
Following a jury award of $104,000 in favor of Jacob, the appellate
court stated that Jacob was a tenant-at-sufferance, rather than a tenant-
at-will.253 As a tenant-at-sufferance, Jacob was merely an occupant in
"naked possession" of the property.254 When a tenant's landlord/mortga-
gor is foreclosed upon by the mortgagee, a tenant's lease is generally ter-
minated.255 The court found that the tenant was not a necessary party to
a foreclosure action, and that the foreclosure terminated the landlord/
tenant relationship between ICM and Jacob. Upon the termination of the
landlord/tenant relationship, no further duty was owed to Jacob which
would support a finding of negligence. 256 Thus, the court reversed the
trial court's verdict in favor of Jacob.
XI. CONSUMER PROTECTION AND DTPA
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Jefferson Associates257 involved
an individual who purchased a four-story office building in Austin. After
the purchase, the purchaser discovered that the building contained asbes-
tos fireproofing, and he filed suit against the seller. The purchaser,
Goldman, maintained that Prudential misrepresented the condition of the
building and failed to disclose that it contained asbestos, which impaired
its value.258 The court began by analyzing the DTPA's causation require-
ments, considering Goldman's purchase of the building "as is." The
DTPA requires only that producing cause be shown. 259 This requires a
showing of actual causation in fact,260 which involves showing the act or
omission was a substantial factor in bringing about an injury which would
not otherwise have occurred. The court held that by purchasing the
building "as is," the purchaser agrees to "make his own appraisal of the
252. Id. at 528-30.
253. Id at 530.
254. Id.
255. Id
256. 902 S.W.2d at 530.
257. 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. 1995).
258. Id. at 159.
259. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon 1987); 896 S.W.2d at 161.
260. 896 S.W.2d at 161.
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bargain and to accept the risk that he may be wrong."'261 Thus, the "as is"
agreement negated all necessary causation showings under the DTPA,
since the purchaser's injury is caused by the purchaser's admission, by the
purchaser himself.262 The court was careful to hold that an "as is" agree-
ment would not bar recovery under the DTPA if that "as is" agreement is
induced by some fraudulent representation of concealment of informa-
tion.263 Additionally, the purchaser would not be bound by an "as is"
agreement if he is impaired from inspecting the building by the sellers'
conduct.264
The purchaser tried to avoid his "as is" agreement with three argu-
ments. First, he argued that the seller knew that there was asbestos pres-
ent in the building. The court held that there was evidence that the seller
might have suspected the existence of asbestos, but no evidence indicated
that the seller actually knew asbestos was present. Since the seller has no
duty to disclose facts he does not know, nor is he liable for failing to
disclose what he should have known, the seller had no liability under the
DTPA for nondisclosure.265 Additionally, the seller had no duty to inves-
tigate whether asbestos was present. The purchaser carried that duty.266
Second, the purchaser argued that the seller withheld plans and specifica-
tions requested by the purchaser, which interfered with his investigation.
The court held that this was immaterial, since the plans and specifications
would not indicate whether any asbestos bearing products were used in
the construction of the building.267 Finally, the purchaser said that the
building's maintenance supervisor represented that the building was "su-
perb," "superfine" and "one of the finest little properties in the City of
Austin," which constituted a fraudulent misrepresentation. 268 The court
held that such statements were mere puffing, not misrepresentations. 269
One additional issue remained. The court held that an "as is" purchase
is not a waiver by a consumer of DTPA provisions, since such a waiver is
against public policy. 270 It is simply a statement that no warranties were
made, not that he would never sue for breach of any warranties. Three
justices disagreed with this conclusion, holding that the "as is" provision
was indeed a waiver of rights under the DTPA. 271
In Parkway Co. v. Woodrufff72 a real estate development company sold
a vacant lot in a master planned community, and several years later negli-
261. Id. (citing Midcontinent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572
S.W.2d 308, 313 (Tex. 1978)).
262. 896 S.W.2d at 161.




267. 896 S.W.2d at 163.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon 1987).
271. 896 S.W.2d at 165-67 (Cornyn, J. concurring).
272. 901 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1995).
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gently caused a home built on that lot to be flooded. The homeowners
argued that negligent construction of the house breached implied warran-
ties from the developer that its future development services would be
performed in a good and workmanlike manner and constituted an uncon-
scionable act; those acts (breach of warranty and unconscionability) were
argued to be DTPA violations.
The court began with the statement that to be actionable under the
DTPA, implied warranties must be recognized by common law or created
by statute.273 The question became whether Texas recognized an implied
warranty to perform future development services. In holding that no
such implied warranty existed, the court noted that the consumers neither
sought nor acquired the services about which they complained. 274 The
court stated that the only transaction which could have created such an
implied warranty was the sale of the undeveloped lot from the developer
to the home builder. While that sale conveyed goods (land), 275 there was
no implication that the developer would perform future services for the
ultimate homeowner's benefit.276 The court also found that no uncon-
scionability existed, since no violative acts were found at the time of the
sale of the property from the developer to the home builder.277
In Kuehnhoefer v. Welch 278 a landowner, who owned agricultural real
estate, leased his ranch to a married couple. When the lease expired and
the parties began to negotiate a renewal, a dispute arose, and the couple
filed a DTPA cause of action.279 On appeal the lessor maintained that
the plaintiffs were not consumers under the DTPA. The DTPA mandates
that the plaintiff or claimant be a consumer as a prerequisite to maintain-
ing a cause of action, which requires that the plaintiff attempt to purchase
goods or services which form the basis of the complaint.280 The DTPA
defines real property leased for use as "goods."'281 The court held that
the lessees attempt to acquire the goods, in the form of land, was suffi-
cient to give them standing as consumers under the DTPA.282
In Smith v. Herco, Inc.28 3 Smith sought to purchase a townhouse from
Herco. At closing, a survey was provided to Smith stating that the build-
ing plan was true and correct, and that there were no encroachments on
the property.28' Smith later tried to sell the townhouse, at which time it
was discovered that the townhouse encroached over the building line into
273. Id. at 438.
274. Id. at 439.
275. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1) (Vernon 1987).
276. 901 S.W.2d at 439. The fact that the community was a master planned community
had no affect on any implied warranties, since such a phrase is a term of art. Id at 440.
277. Id. at 434.
278. 893 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied).
279. Id. at 691.
280. Id at 693 (citing Sherman Simon Enters., Inc. v. Lorac Serv. Corp., 724 S.W.2d 13
(Tex. 1987)).
281. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1) (Vernon 1987).
282. 893 S.W.2d at 693-94.
283. 900 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied).
284. Id. at 855.
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a neighboring development's common area. Smith was unable to secure
waivers by all property owners in the development, which prevented his
selling the property, upon which he was eventually forced to stop making
mortgage payments.285 Smith then sued Herco and the surveyor for
DTPA violations. The surveying company successfully asserted the two-
year statute of limitations in the DTPA.286 Smith had asserted that the
ten-year statute of limitations applicable to surveyors controlled this ac-
tion.287 The court disagreed, holding that the statutory DTPA action was
to be controlled exclusively by its own statutory limitations, not by a sep-
arate statute.288 Consequently, only the developer remained in the
litigation.
The essential question of Smith's claim against Herco was whether
Herco made an affirmative misrepresentation regarding the townhouse's
encroachments. Herco claimed that it had no knowledge that the
townhouse encroached on the common areas. The court responded that
Herco had made affirmative oral and written representations that it
would "sell, deed and give title to Smith of all [the townhouse]." 289 That
representation was false, and Herco had a duty to know if its representa-
tions were true. The court stated that when a representation is false, it is
no defense of the representation to claim that Herco had some particular
basis for the reason of its representations' falsity.290 Thus, Smith could
maintain an action under the DTPA for misrepresentations associated
with the sale of the townhouse.
XII. TAX
A. CASE LAW
The first case for consideration is an "omitted property" case, and it
stands for the proposition that property rendered for taxation is still
"omitted property" when the Chief Appraiser fails to do his job. Harris
County Appraisal District v. Reynolds/Texas, J. V,291 related to the right of
the County Appraisal Review Board ("ARB") to assess back tax liability
for improvements to a taxpayer's land that an ARB determines to be
"omitted property." In Reynolds, the taxpayer hired a tax agent/consult-
ant to handle ad valorem property tax matters affecting the taxpayer's
property. Each year the taxpayer's agent filed a rendition with the Harris
County Appraisal District and each year the rendition reported the value
of the taxpayer's land. The rendition also included a line item for im-
provements, but no amount was inserted for a value for the improve-
ments. The Appraisal District considered the improvements to be
285. Id. at 856.
286. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.565 (Vernon 1987).
287. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.011 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
288. 900 S.W.2d at 857.
289. Id. at 859.
290. Id.
291. 884 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
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"omitted property" within the meaning of section 25.21 of the Texas
Property Tax Code. 292 At the trial court level, the taxpayer noted that
section 22.01 of the Tax Code deals with rendition of property and it pro-
vides that with respect to real property (the land and improvements
thereon) a person may render such property for taxation. However, a
person is not required to render land or the improvements on it for taxa-
tion. Further, section 22.24 provides that a rendition or report form shall
permit but may not require a property owner to state his opinion about
the market value of his property. Further, the Property Tax Code pro-
vides that the burden is upon the chief appraiser to give the property
owner notice of the appraised value if the appraised value of the property
is greater than the value rendered by the property owner. 293 The trial
court determined that the improvements were not "omitted property."
Clearly, if a property owner had followed these steps, it has complied
with the Tax Code, in which case the property should not be considered
"omitted property" and the chief appraiser should be obligated to do his
job. However, the El Paso Court of Appeals, although presented with
the arguments, failed to consider or at least discuss the rendition issues.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the taxpayer. In view of the fact that the taxpayer prevailed
on the argument that the Appraisal District could back assess for only
five years rather than the ten-year period previously provided, the eco-
nomics did not warrant, in the opinion of the property owner, that the
case be appealed. With regard to this case, the court of appeals makes
reference to the fact that "[e]ven assuming that the documents submitted
by Reynolds to the appraiser did properly render the improvements upon
its land for taxation, that did not bar the appraisal district's subsequent
correction of its erroneous appraisal, so long as that correction was within
the deadline imposed by the statute. ' 294 The court did not consider the
proper "deadline" statute since section 25.19 requires the chief appraiser
to make such "correction" by May 15 of the tax year. Section 25.25 of
the Property Tax Code also contains specific provisions regarding correc-
tion of an appraisal roll, but the facts of this case do not fall within the
parameters of that section.
In Gregg County Appraisal District v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. 295
the principal dispute concerns valuations of land for ad valorem tax pur-
poses. This would not otherwise be considered a case for discussion pur-
poses in this survey because there is nothing particularly "legal" about
the valuation process, but there are a few things noteworthy. Defendant
292. Section 25.21(a) provides that "[i]f the chief appraiser discovers that real property
was omitted from an appraisal role in any one of the five (5) preceding years ... he shall
appraise the property as of January 1 of each year that it was omitted and enter the prop-
erty and its appraised value in the appraisal records." TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.21(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1996). Prior to January 1, 1992 the statute permitted the chief appraiser to
back assess for ten years rather than five.
293. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.19 (Vernon 1992).
294. 884 S.W.2d. at 529.
295. 907 S.W.2d. 12 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1995, writ denied).
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Four-S owned a tract of land in Gregg County. Four-S leased the land to
Tiger Corporation under an agreement dated March 19, 1981 for use as a
solid waste landfill. The term of the lease was twenty-five years. Tiger
Corporation was purchased by Laidlaw Holdings and Tiger Corporation's
name was changed to Laidlaw Waste System (Texas), Inc. Four-S ap-
pointed Laidlaw Texas as its designated agent for ad valorem tax pur-
poses. Laidlaw Holdings is owned by Laidlaw Delaware. Prior to 1990,
the district appraised the land at approximately $600,000, but the district
reappraised the land in 1990 and increased its value to approximately 7.1
million dollars. If that was not enough of an increase for Laidlaw, in 1991
the appraised value went to approximately 8.5 million dollars and in 1992
it went to approximately 9.5 million dollars. The Appraisal Review
Board approved the Appraisal District's valuations for 1990 and 1991, but
reduced the 1992 valuation to 5.9 million dollars. The trial court reduced
the value to $587,220.00. The Appraisal District challenged the trial
court's jurisdiction for tax years 1990 and 1991 on the grounds that the
appeal was filed by Laidlaw Delaware, the parent of the parent, but not
the property owner nor its designated agent for property tax purposes.
Thus, the Appraisal District's argument is that neither the property
owner, Four-S, nor its agent, Laidlaw Texas, filed the appeal within the
forty five day requirement of the Property Tax Code. 296 The Appraisal
District argued that section 42.21 is jurisdictional and that the failure of
the property owner or its designated agent to be included at the time suit
was filed deprived the trial court of jurisdiction for years 1990 and 1991.
Laidlaw Texas was joined as a party in the suit more than 45 days after
receipt of notice of the Appraisal Review Board's final order which trig-
gered the time for filing the Petition in a trial court. Four-S intervened
even later. The court, citing Appraisal Review Board v. International
Church of the Foursquare Gospel297 and several other cases, held that the
requirements of section 42.21 of the Tax Code are jurisdictional and the
failure of the property owner to timely file its Petition appealing an Ap-
praisal Review Board's order determining protest deprived the trial court
of jurisdiction.298 The moral of the story is that you can't let your parents
do everything for you, especially in dealing with ad valorem taxes. The
Laidlaws made a number of good arguments, even compelling arguments,
the best being in the author's opinion a reverse upstream piercing of its
own corporate veil but to no avail.299 See the comments at the end of this
section regarding "New Legislation" and the rights of a lessee to protect
the Appraisal District's valuation.
The next case for discussion, Harris County Appraisal District v. World
Houston, Inc.,300 is a nice case for the lawyers who like to do things the
old fashioned way, i.e., at the courthouse, as opposed to using some
296. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.41 (Vernon 1992).
297. 719 S.W.2d. 160 (Tex. 1986).
298. 907 S.W.2d. at 16.
299. Id. at 17.
300. 905 S.W.2d. 594 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
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"newfangled" alternative dispute resolution procedure. This case is men-
tioned here only as a reminder to those who do not regularly work in the
"Property Tax" area and whose client walks in the door for assistance
after the protest period has passed. In this case, the property owners did
not like the valuation placed upon their property by the Appraisal Dis-
trict. The "normal" method of protesting a bad appraisal by the Ap-
praisal District is to file a protest pursuant to section 41.41 of the Tax
Code which gives the property owner the right to appear before the Ap-
praisal Review Board. If the property owner does not like the Appraisal
Review Board's determination, then the property owner has a right to
bring an action in the district court. Once the property owner's petition is
filed in the district court, the property owner can have a trial de novo or
have its appeal resolved through binding arbitration. 30' World Houston
did not protest but instead relied upon the provisions of section 25.25(d)
of the Tax Code.30 2 World Houston filed a motion pursuant to section
25.25(d) and did get some relief, but not enough. It further appealed to
the district court and requested that the matter be referred to arbitration
which the trial court did. The Appraisal District obviously did not like
the result so it appealed based upon the argument that section 25.25(g) of
the Tax Code does not permit arbitration.30 3 The court of appeal's deci-
sion is based upon sound reasoning and upholds the Appraisal District's
position which is a step back for ADR proponents.
In Jim Sowell Construction Co. v. Dallas Central Appraisal District304
the Dallas Court of Appeals also had the opportunity to consider section
25.25(d) of the Tax Code. In this case the property was owned by one
party on January 1, 1991, and sold to Sowell on July 2, 1991. On or about
May 15, 1991, the Appraisal Review Board appraised the property for
approximately 7.1 million dollars. The first owner filed a Notice of Pro-
test pursuant to Chapter 41 of the Tax Code and the Appraisal Review
Board scheduled a hearing on July 2, 1991. The seller (first owner) with-
drew the protest because of its pending sale to Sowell. Sowell acquired
the property for approximately 4 million dollars. Sowell in December,
1991, filed a motion to correct the valuation pursuant to section 25.25(d).
301. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.225 (Vernon 1992).
302. Section 25.25(d) provides that:
At any time prior to the date that taxes become delinquent, a property owner
or the chief appraiser may file a motion with the appraisal review board to
change the appraisal role to correct an error that resulted in an incorrect
appraised value for the owner's property. However, the error may not be
corrected unless it resulted in an appraised value that exceeds by more than
one-third the correct appraised value . . . . The roll may not be changed
under this subsection if the property was the subject of a protest brought by
the property owner under Chapter 41 ....
Id. § 25.25(d).
303. Section 25.25(g) states that "[wlithin 45 days after receiving notice of the appraisal
review board's determination of a motion under this section, the property owner or the
chief appraiser may file suit to compel the board to order a change in the appraisal role as
required by this section." Id. § 25.25(g).
304. 900 S.W.2d. 82 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied).
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The Appraisal Review Board denied Sowell's request for a hearing and
Sowell filed an action in the trial court. The Appraisal Board argued that
Sowell was not entitled to a hearing on its 25.25(d) motion because pro-
test was filed under Chapter 41 and, whether or not adjudicated, relief
was barred under 25.25(d). The court disagreed and determined that be-
cause there was never a hearing on the Chapter 41 protest, Sowell can
avail itself of 25.25(d). Thus, the court noted as a matter of law that an
unadjudicated notice of protest filed by a prior property owner which is
later withdrawn does not bar a hearing on a subsequent section 25.25(d)
motion by the new property owner.
In Syntax, Inc. v. Hall30 5 the Texas Supreme Court determined that the
"syntax" should be construed in favor of Syntax. Does this make sense?
Not really. In 1988 the Klein Independent School District (K.I.S.D.) and
Harris County secured a judgement against Verna Neal for delinquent
real property taxes and for foreclosure of their tax lien. On May 3, 1988,
a tax sale was held by public auction but no bids were received. The
property was "struck off" to K.I.S.D. for the minimum bid amount, the
amount of the delinquent taxes. After the two-year redemption period
passed, K.I.S.D. arranged to sell the property, and in 1991 John L. Hall,
Sr. and Steve Ray Kasprzak bought the property for $85,000.00. K.I.S.D.
paid Harris County the amount of taxes to which it (Harris County) was
entitled, and K.I.S.D. pocketed the difference. After the sale to Hall and
Kasprzak, Ms. Neal executed an Assignment to Syntax assigning her
rights to receive any excess funds. Syntax recorded the assignment and
Hall and Kasprzak filed suit to quite title to the property. Syntax filed
counterclaims against Hall and Kasprzak as well as against K.I.S.D. and
Harris County to recover those excess funds. The trial court and the
court of appeals let K.I.S.D. keep the excess funds, which seems like a
good result, but nonetheless the Texas Supreme Court held that the "syn-
tax" of sections 34.02 and 34.06 of the Tax Code requires that the excess
funds be paid to Syntax. 306 In reviewing the case, it is important to distin-
guish between the sale of real property at a tax foreclosure sale and a
resale of property purchased by a taxing unit at a tax foreclosure sale.
Section 34.06 deals with the distribution of the proceeds in the case of a
resale of property purchased by a taxing unit at a tax foreclosure sale.30 7
K.I.S.D. argued that section 34.01(c) of the Tax Code extinguishes any
rights of Mrs. Neal and her successor Syntax, Inc. This section provides
in part that "[t]he taxing unit's title includes all of the interest owned by
the defendant, including the defendant's right to the use and possession
305. 899 S.W.2d. 189 (Tex. 1995).
306. Id.
307. Section 34.06 provides that:
(a) the proceeds of a resale of property purchased by a taxing unit at a tax
foreclosure sale shall be paid to the purchasing taxing unit;(b) the purchasing taxing unit shall pay all costs and expenses of court and
sale and shall distribute the remainder of the proceeds as provided by § 34.02
of this code or distribution of proceeds after payment of costs.
Tax. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.06 (Vernon 1992).
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of the property, subject only to the defendant's right of redemption. '30 8
Syntax argues that 34.06 "kicks" you back to section 34.02 which deals
with distribution of proceeds of a tax sale. It is clear under section 34.02
that if the sale is pursuant to foreclosure of a tax lien, the officer con-
ducting the sale must pay any excess proceeds after payment of all cost
and of all taxes, penalties and interest due to all participants in the sale,
to the clerk of the court issuing the order of sale. The court's conclusion
is that a resale of the property acquired by K.I.S.D. at a foreclosure sale is
the same as a sale pursuant to foreclosure of a tax lien. Certainly, when
property is foreclosed pursuant to foreclosure of a tax lien and it is struck
off to a third party, i.e. a party other than a taxing unit, the application of
excess proceeds is consistent with what we consider to be normal distribu-
tion of proceeds under a nonjudicial power of sale foreclosure. When a
lender exercises its right to foreclose under its power of sale, it will pay
the excess proceeds to a debtor. However, if the lender acquires the
property at the foreclosure sale and subsequently resells it, there is no
obligation to pay any excess amounts to the debtor. Section 34.05 pro-
vides that if property is sold to a taxing unit that is a party to the judg-
ment (such as K.I.S.D.) the taxing unit may sell the property at any time,
subject to any right of redemption existing at the time of the sale. There
are no other qualifications. Further, section 34.06(b) provides that the
purchasing taxing unit shall pay all costs and expenses of court and sale
and shall distribute the remainder of the proceeds as provided by code
section 34.02 for distribution of proceeds after payment of cost. Section
34.02(a) describes the distribution after payment of cost, and it provides
that the remainder is distributed to all taxing units participating in the
sale in satisfaction of the taxes, penalties and interest due each period.
However, 34.02(c) imposes upon the officer conducting a foreclosure tax
sale, the duty after paying all costs, taxes, penalties and interest to all
participants, to deposit excess proceeds in the court, but this is limited to
circumstances in which the sale is pursuant to foreclosure of a tax lien.
Clearly, 34.01 and 34.02 deal with foreclosure of a tax lien and 34.01
through 34.04 should be considered together, but 34.05 deals with a dif-
ferent type of sale, i.e. a resale, and that resale does not have to be pursu-
ant to a public sale by an officer. 309 Three of the justices dissented and
their dissent makes a compelling argument.
B. NEW LEGISLATION
There are several new pieces of legislation worth noting. Chapter 41 of
the Tax Code was amended by adding section 41.413 which provides, in
part, that a person leasing real estate who is contractually obligated to
reimburse the property owner for taxes imposed on the property is enti-
tled to protest before the Appraisal Review Board a determination of the
appraised value of the property, if the property owner does not file a
308. Id. § 34.01.
309. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1232 (1990).
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protest relating to the property. Additionally, Chapter 42 of the Tax
Code was amended by adding section 42.015 which also gives the lessee
the right to appeal an order of the Appraisal Review Board determining
a protest brought under section 41.413.
Also, the Tax Code was amended by adding section 31.115 to provide
that payment of an ad valorem tax is involuntary if the taxpayer indicates
that it is being paid under protest on the instrument by which the tax is
paid or in an accompanying document.
Finally, section 11.13 of the Tax Code was amended to permit a surviv-
ing spouse who is at least fifty-five years old to continue receiving an
exemption for the residence homestead of a person sixty-five or older so




The Real Estate License Act ("RELA") was relegislated by the addi-
tion of section 15F. That section states that parties to a transaction are
not liable for misrepresentations or concealments of material fact made
by brokers unless the party knew of the misrepresentation or conceal-
ments and failed to disclose the party's knowledge of the statement or
concealment. 310 Similarly, a broker is not liable for a party's misrepre-
sentations or concealments of material fact unless the broker was aware
of those statements or concealments. Finally, neither the party nor the
broker is liable for misrepresentations or concealments by a subagent un-
less they were aware of those statements or concealments. Thus, RELA
has modified any common law obligations of parties, brokers or sub-
agents in transactions with regard to liability for misrepresentations or
concealments. 311
B. REAL ESTATE RECOVERY FUND
The Real Estate Recovery Fund was established as part of RELA to
protect a person who has an uncollectible judgment against a licensed
broker. A person with an uncollectible judgment may file a claim against
the Fund in the court in which judgment was rendered and apply for an
order directing payment out of the Fund.312 At a hearing on application
for reimbursement from the Fund, the claimant holding the uncollectible
judgment must show that the judgment is against a licensed broker who
caused the claimant's damages in an act that violated either section
15(a)(3) or section 15(a)(6) of RELA. In Gamble v. Norton313 the court
was faced with the issue of whether a broker who acted as a principal in a
310. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 15F(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
311. Id. § 15F(d).
312. Id. § 8(e).
313. 893 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
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transaction could subject the Fund to a claim for payment. Norton, the
broker, acted with an investor in joint ventures to purchase three proper-
ties. Norton's joint venturers maintained that Norton breached fiduciary
duties owed to them by putting title to the property in his name, using the
property as collateral for loans, and paying himself undisclosed commis-
sions.314 The court held that with regard to putting title in Norton's
name, Norton was the managing partner for two of the properties, so he
acted as a co-venturer and not "for another person" as required by
RELA to allow recovery from the Fund. 315 Similarly, the court held that
Norton's use of the property as collateral for loans used to pay partner-
ship obligations was an act taken by Norton as a partner, rather than as a
broker acting on behalf of another person. Since he was not acting for
another person, Norton did not violate RELA; thus, the Fund was not
subject to recovery.316 Finally, regarding the undisclosed commissions,
the court held that although Norton was acting as a broker or real estate
agent, he was entitled to the commissions by contract. Thus, his conduct
did not violate RELA.317 From this case we can surmise that the courts
strictly construe the phrase "for another person" in RELA, before they
allow recovery against the Real Estate Recovery Fund.
C. SUFFICIENCY OF COMMISSION AGREEMENT
RELA contains its own version of the statute of frauds, which requires
that agreements for the payment of real estate commissions to brokers
must be in writing.318 Warner Communications, Inc. v. Keller3 19 ad-
dressed the question of whether particular commission agreements were
a sufficient writing or memorandum of the agreement to pay commis-
sions. The court stated that the writing must meet four requirements: it
must (1) be signed by the person to be charged with the conmmission, (2)
contain a promise to pay a definite commission or refer to a commission
schedule, (3) state the name of the broker to be paid, and (4) identify
with reasonable certainty the land conveyed. 320 The writing's essential
elements cannot be supplied by parol testimony, and the requirements of
the statute of frauds must be strictly enforced. 321
314. Id. at 136-37.
315. Id. at 137.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 137-38.
318. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996). This version
of the statute of frauds requires that:
An action may not be brought in this State for the recovery of a commission
for the sale or purchase of real estate unless the promise or agreement on
which the action is brought, or some memorandum thereof, is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged or signed by a person lawfully authorized
by him to sign it.
Id.
319. 888 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
320. Id. at 591-92.
321. Id. at 592.
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The broker in Warner Communications, James Keller, did not have a
written commission agreement. Keller did have, however, an informa-
tional letter sent by the property owner to all commercial brokers in the
El Paso area, which listed buildings available for lease and that the
owner, Texas Builders, would pay a six percent commission for all signed
leases. The court held that because the letter stated the property to be
leased by address (12050 Rojas) was signed by the owner's property man-
ager, stated the commission to be paid (six percent) and named the realty
firm to which the letter was addressed, the letter was sufficient to meet
the statute of frauds contained in section 20(b). 32 2 The court noted that
the writing need not describe the property with the exact specificity re-
quired in deeds; in fact, a street address alone would be reasonably cer-
tain as a description of the property to justify a commission where the
broker presents extrinsic evidence explaining or clarifying the data con-
tained in the writing.323 Thus, the landlord was held liable under the stat-
ute of frauds for commissions owed to a real estate broker merely by
virtue of an informational brochure sent to the broker identifying proper-
ties available for lease.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 593-95.
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